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Abstract 
 
China’s identity in climate politics can be argued to be in a dilemma of being a responsible 
leader or a developing country that still requires time for its emissions to peak. In 2015 in 
COP21 in Paris, China was negotiating with the BASIC countries and bilaterally with the US. 
The objective of research was to recognize China’s geopolitical identity in climate politics in the 
BASIC and US-China frames and to discuss the possible similarities and differences. The 
hypothesis was that China identifies itself geopolitically differently in the two frames. The 
analysis was conducted on the basis of two questions in geopolitical identity: who is China and 
where is China? 
  
China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), as the most important body 
of China’s climate politics, has published news releases of the meetings with the BASIC 
countries and the United States. These documents were analyzed with a critical discourse 
analysis frame. Discourses of who is China -question were discussed under four themes 
emerged from the data: climate change, the principle of CBDRC, leadership and Paris 
Agreement. Where is China -question was considered based on places that most frequently 
appeared in the documents: developing countries, the US-China coalition, BASIC countries, 
developed countries, Convention, Parties, Climate Change Working Group, Green Climate 
Fund, G-77 & China, and Annex B -countries. The results were applied by evaluating the 
BASIC and the US-China frames as discourse-practice regimes, recognizing the climate 
change framings of the these two and then, suggesting a geopolitical climate mapping of the 
frames. 
 
The conclusion confronted the hypothesis as China tolerably considered itself as a 
representative of developing countries in both frames, while instead the discourse of climate 
change was different between the two. Thus, China is not negotiating in the two frames 
because of different identities but has distinguished goals for them. The worldviews of the two 
frames are different. The BASIC one is strongly based on confronting the developed nations 
and building on the dichotomy. The worldview of the US-China frame is a more postmodern 
one and thus, questions the “norm” of being a developing country in international climate 
politics. The BASIC frame is a one-question coalition, whereas the US-China frame includes 
more diverse cooperation and is slightly closer to China’s own climate policy like its INDC 
document.  
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Tiivistelmä 
Kiinan identiteetti ilmastopolitiikassa on problemaattinen. Toisaalta Kiina on vastuullinen johtaja 
ja toisaalta taas kehitysmaa, joka vielä tarvitsee aikaa päästöjensä taittamiseen. Vuonna 2015 
COP21 Pariisin ilmastokokouksessa Kiina neuvotteli BASIC-maiden ryhmittymässä sekä 
kahdenkeskisesti Yhdysvaltojen kanssa. Tutkimuksen tavoite on tunnistaa Kiinan geopoliittinen 
identiteetti ilmastopolitiikassa BASIC-maiden ja Yhdysvaltojen kehyksissä. Pyrkimyksenä on 
myös vertailla näitä kahta kehystä ja keskustella mahdollisten samankaltaisuuksien ja 
eroavaisuuksien merkityksestä. Tutkimuksen hypoteesin mukaan Kiina identifioi itsenä 
geopoliittisesti eri tavalla eri kehyksissä. Analyysi pohjautui kahdelle kysymykselle: kuka on 
Kiina ja missä on Kiina?   
  
Kiinan tärkein ilmastotoimija, National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
julkaisee uutistiedotteita Kiinan tapaamisista BASIC-maiden ja Yhdysvaltojen kanssa. Nämä 
tiedotteet analysoitiin kriittisen diskurssianalyysin avulla. Kuka on Kiina –diskurssit jaettiin 
neljään teemaan, joita olivat ilmastonmuutos, CBDRC periaate, johtajuus ja Pariisin sopimus. 
Missä on Kiina –kysymyksen vastaus pohjustettiin dokumenteista esille nousseisiin paikkoihin: 
kehitysmaat, Yhdysvallat ja Kiina ryhmittymä, BASIC-maat, kehittyneet maat, Convention, 
UNFCCC:n jäsenvaltiot, Climate Change Working Group, ilmastorahasto GCF, G-77 ja Kiina 
ryhmittymä sekä Annex B –maat. Tuloksia sovellettiin arvioimalla BASIC-maiden ja 
Yhdysvaltojen kehyksiä diskurssi-käytäntöjärjestelminä, keskustelemalla kehyksien 
ilmastonmuutoksen kontekstualisoinnista sekä muodostamalla ehdotus kehyksien 
geopoliittisesta ilmastopolitiikan maailmankuvasta.  
 
Johtopäätökset kyseenalaistivat hypoteesin, sillä Kiina identifioi itsensä kehitysmaiden 
edustajaksi kummassakin kehyksessä. Sen sijaan, kehyksien ilmastonmuutos-diskurssi oli 
erilainen. Kiina ei siis neuvottele kahdessa kehyksessä identiteettimurroksen takia, sillä on 
erilaiset tavoitteet kehyksille. Kehyksien maailmankuvat olivat erilaiset. BASIC-maat näkivät 
maailman vastakkainasetteluna kehitysmaiden ja kehittyneiden maiden välillä. Yhdysvaltojen 
kehyksen maailmankuva oli postmodernimpi ja se kyseenalaisti kehitysmaa statuksen normin 
kansainvälisessä ilmastopolitiikassa. BASIC-kehys oli yhden argumentin ryhmittymä, kun taas 
Kiinan ja Yhdysvaltojen yhteistyö oli monipuolisempaa ja hieman lähempänä Kiinan kansallista 
ilmastopolitiikkaa kuten sen INDC dokumenttia. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The origin of international climate politics is dated to the end of 1970s (Virtanen & Rohweder 
2011) but the politics of climate change did not truly strengthen until after the climate and 
development conference Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Summit accepted 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which entered 
into force in 1994 and is at the present time ratified by 197 countries often referred as the 
Parties to the Convention (UNFCCC 2016). The Convention is considered as an important 
first step in climate politics history because for the first time after the recognition of the 
problem climate change, countries agreed on stabilizing the greenhouse gases (GHG) on a 
non-hazardous level (Virtanen & Rohweder 2011; UNFCCC 2016). The Convention also 
provides a global platform to create a cooperative response especially between the North and 
the South (Litfin 2008). The highest decisive body of the Convention, the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) has been organized annually being responsible of the implementation and 
development of the agreement (UNFCCC 2016). Altogether 21 Conferences of Parties have 
been organized, the latest one being COP21 in 2015 in Paris and the next one COP22 will be 
held in Marrakech in November 2016 (UNFCCC 2016).  
 
The legally binding Kyoto Protocol (KP) was negotiated based on the Convention for the 
commitment period of 2008-2012 (Kyoto Protocol 1998). KP became accepted in COP3 in 
1997 and entered into force as late as 2005 (Virtanen & Rohweder 2011). The Convention 
and the Kyoto Protocol can be considered milestones for climate politics. The Convention’s 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRC) 
and the Kyoto division of the world can be said to have framed the whole history of 
international negotiations (Litfin 2008). Some suggest that the Kyoto division of developed 
and developing countries was based on the Cold War tendency to divide the world into two 
blocks such as rich versus poor, developed versus developing and powerful versus incapable 
(Gomez-Echeverri 2013). The dichotomy has held strong since in the post Kyoto negotiations 
for example China is partly argued to rather identify itself still as a developing country (Chen 
2012; Kopra 2013).  
 
Nonetheless, the early 21st century has seen a change in the homogeneous, especially in the 
group of developing countries (Vihma et al. 2011), which have caused the line of the 
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dichotomy to have become more complex (Brunnée and Streck 2013; Gomez-Echeverri 2013; 
Blaxekjær and Nielsen 2015). This complexity has been especially interesting from the 
perspective of China. In COP21 Paris in 2015, it was negotiating under the G-77 & China but 
also with a coalition of BASIC countries. BASIC countries is a group of emerging nations 
who founded the coalition prior to COP15 in 2009 "to create a common position" (Hallding et 
al. 2011; COP21 2015). In addition to this, together with the United States, China made a 
strong effort for a success in COP21 in the form of emission cutting agreement published in 
2014 (Dalby 2016a).  
 
Another climate act of China in 2015 was the submission of its Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution (INDC) to UNFCCC on 30th June 2015. The document presents 
China’s quantitative commitments to combat climate change. China’s position in climate 
change is interesting because the rise of China questions the typical assumption of the West as 
developed (Wirth 2015). This can be thought to further challenge the traditional dichotomy of 
climate politics. In addition, though there has been a decline in the connection between the 
economic growth and the growing CO2 emissions due to technological progress (Han and Lee 
2003), China’s economy and emissions have also brought the nation to the center of attention 
in international climate politics (Chen 2012). As China influences the success of international 
climate negotiations greatly, to discuss China’s climate change policies and interests will also 
help to understand the global climate discussion better.  
 
The following subchapters present the research problem and hypothesis, and discuss the 
objectives of the research as well as the key concepts. After this, the second chapter will offer 
a brief overview of international climate politics and China’s climate policies. The third 
chapter will introduce the theoretical frame of critical geopolitics and geopolitical identity 
which will be in this research applied to the context of climate change. The fourth part 
presents the two frames in which the analysis was conducted and the fifth explains the 
methodology and the analysis process of the research. Results of this analysis are presented in 
chapter six, which are then discussed in chapter seven. The conclusions of the study are 
discussed in chapter eight. 
1.1. Research Problem & Hypothesis 
China is facing a dilemma of being a responsible leader or a developing country that still 
requires time before its emissions can peak. This can be discussed also as a responsibility of 
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great powers versus being a responsible developing country. In China’s case Kopra (2013) 
argues that there is a conflict between the fact that on the other hand China does not identify 
itself as a great power but on the other hand it wants to show responsibility that is expected 
from it. This conflict is in the core of this study’s research problem.  
 
China has been argued to use conflicting discourses in its climate policy but does it use the 
“developing country” status differently in different frames and what does it tell about China’s 
geopolitical identity? Geopolitical identity is always defined in relation to others (Newman 
2000) which is why China’s geopolitical identity is discussed through its climate cooperation 
with other Parties. This research compares the two frames China was negotiating under the 
COP21 Paris in 2015: the coalition of emerging nations known as the BASIC countries 
including Brazil, South Africa, India and China and the bilateral cooperation between China 
and the US. Is China identifying itself differently in the two frames or is the geopolitical 
identity only something that is always defined in relation to others which would explain the 
behavior in different frames? 
 
The objective of the research is to scan these two frames and to search whether China’s 
geopolitical imagination and identity is different in them. In addition to this, the purpose is to 
try to understand why China is behaving in a certain manner in a certain frame? Is there a 
connection between China’s geopolitical identity and disadvantages/advantages of being a 
developing country in climate politics? 
 
Consequently, to investigate this problem the research will focus on these three questions: 
 
● How China positions itself in the frame of BASIC countries and in the US-China 
frame? 
● Is the geopolitical identity similar or different within the two frames? 
● Why is the geopolitical identity similar/different? 
 
The hypothesis of the research is that the geopolitical identity would be different in the two 
frames. The hypothesis is based on earlier research by for example Kopra (2013) who has 
been researching the climate discourses of China and the dilemma between its growing 
international status and simultaneous emphasis of poor developing country status. She has 
come to the conclusion that China wishes to continue its responsible developing country 
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discourse. As Kopra’s article is written in 2013 it also states that China will unlikely take 
more global responsibility in the matter of climate change. However, the Sino-American 
climate agreement in 2014 can be argued to have influenced the contemporary geopolitical 
relations (Dalby 2016a). Therefore, this research tries to understand whether China’s position 
is different today meaning it would be negotiating with different kind of geopolitical identities 
than before.  
 
1.2. Objectives of the Research 
The role of geopolitical research is growing increasingly important especially in the field of 
political geography research (Harle & Moisio 2000). This could be supported by Allen’s 
(2008: 95) claim that Political Geography is interested in “the use of power to administer, 
control and fix territorial space”. This research can be located mainly on the theoretical frame 
of critical geopolitics but also to some extent discuss ideas from International Relations and 
Development Geography.  
 
This study is interested especially in the relation between developing country identity and the 
climate geopolitics. According to Müller (2008), this kind of relation between identity and 
geopolitics is among the most researched and relevant topics in critical geopolitical tradition. 
Geopolitical discourses can be applied to the construction of geopolitical identities (Müller 
2008). China’s geopolitical discourses in climate policy have been researched by for example 
Agnew (2010), Eva (2013) and Kopra (2013). This research attempts to focus on developing 
country identity and the identity building process in general, and refresh the discourses to 
correspond the situation after Paris Agreement and the US-China bilateral climate agreement.  
 
This research is particularly interested in the identities of developed and developing countries 
since one of the most critical questions in climate politics has been the financial support 
between these two (Gomez-Echeverri 2013). This research’s interest of China comes also 
from the geopolitical tradition since for example Agnew (2010) has suggested that 
contemporary critical geopolitics could have something to give for the research of China’s 
growth. Geopolitical research about China could simultaneously create knowledge about the 
country but also improve the understanding of China in the world. Agnew has encouraged to 
bring China more into the core of critical geopolitical research. 
 
  5 
Climate change negotiations, China’s geopolitical identity and the two frames cover multiple 
themes. This study has drawn the line of focusing on China’s geopolitical identity especially 
in the two frames in the climate negotiations without focusing on the technical details of 
quantitative emission targets, amounts and mechanisms of climate funding and official 
UNFCCC documents. This limitation will exclude some of the aspects influencing China’s 
geopolitical identity. This is acknowledged as the outcome is not attempted to be a 
comprehensive description of China’s geopolitical identity but to increase the understanding 
of the identity building process in climate politics. 
 
1.3. Key Concepts 
The theoretical key concepts of this research are geopolitical discourse and geopolitical 
identity which will be explained further in the theoretical frame in chapter 3 and continued in 
the methodology chapter 5. In order to understand the UNFCCC climate negotiations, the 
contextual concepts are explained here to be clarified before going further into the 
background.  The contextual concepts are the dichotomy between the developed and 
developing countries also known as the Annex B -division, the Convention’s principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRC) and the 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC documents).  
 
The Dichotomy of Developed and Developing Countries 
This dichotomy of developing and developed countries was visible already in the Convention 
where Parties had agreed on developed countries taking the lead on tackling climate change 
because of their largest share of historical and current global emissions (Convention 1992). 
The text of the Convention also justifies the dichotomy with the possible future increase in 
developing countries’ share of the global emissions to meet their social and development 
needs.  
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Figure 1. Kyoto Dichotomy of Annex B and Non-Annex Countries. Non-Annex states include mostly 
developing countries, whereas Annex B countries consist of OECD member countries in 1992 and countries in 
the process of transition to a market economy. (Kyoto Protocol 1998; GADM 2016)  
 
The so called burden sharing of the Kyoto Protocol divided the world into Annex B - and non-
Annex countries setting quantitative emission reductions only on Annex B-countries (Kyoto 
Protocol 1998). This division can be seen in figure 1. Annex B countries alias developed 
countries included the members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in 1992 and the Economies in Transition including the Russian 
Federation, the Baltic States, and a number of Central and Eastern European States (UNFCCC 
2016). Non-Annex countries were the rest of the Parties seen as developing countries. 
Developing countries position of not having binding emission obligations in the Protocol is 
suggested to be a merit of China for its role as the leading negotiator in the developing 
country group (Chen 2012).  
 
The Principle of CBDRC 
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities 
(CBDRC) is one of the most relevant principles of the climate negotiations for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is mentioned in nearly all UNFCCC outcomes including the Convention and Kyoto 
Protocol (Brunnée & Streck 2013; Blaxekjær & Nielsen 2015). The basic thought of the 
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principle, the need for wide cooperation and countries’ joint responsibility to protect the 
environment but taking into account countries’ respective domestic circumstances, is already 
agreed upon in the UNFCCC Preamble in 1992 (Brunnée & Streck 2013).  
 
Secondly, the principle is relevant because though many agree on the general ideas, the 
deeper meaning of national circumstances has remained ambiguous. The reason why the 
principle can be said to frame the post-Kyoto era of the climate negotiations, is largely 
dependent on these complex understandings of the basis of the differentiation. Developing 
countries see the CBDRC to refer to historically unequal contributions on climate change, 
thus acting as a “firewall” between the developing and the developed countries (Blaxekjær & 
Nielsen 2015). However, developed countries are said to reject the idea of strong North-South 
dichotomy rather focusing on “capacity, and current and future contributions to climate 
change”. As the Convention and Kyoto Protocol are drafted as compromises between the 
Parties, both sides have managed to form the texts as compatible with their own view of the 
CBDRC. (Brunnée & Streck 2013) 
 
A common understanding of the CBDRC will unlikely be achieved as there are a number of 
socio-economic and political factors to be considered when comparing the Parties’ national 
circumstances (Brunnée & Streck 2013). Therefore, they suggest Parties deciding themselves 
about their circumstances’ relevance. In 2013, Brunnée and Streck have estimated that this 
bottom-up approach could lead to achieving an agreement in Paris but at the same time they 
are questioning whether this approach manages to achieve a sufficient ambition. 
 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions  
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) currently represent the public prime 
channel between the international and national climate politics. They are drafted on a national 
level considering the domestic circumstances and capabilities indicating their initiative 
towards reducing emissions by 2050 (Dalby 2016b). These contributions thus supports the 
statement of the climate negotiation process shifting further towards the bottom-up approach. 
The World Resource Institute (2016) describes a good INDC as ambitious, equitable and 
transparent. According to the UNFCCC INDC Portal (2016) instructions the INDC can 
include “quantifiable information on the reference point (including, as appropriate, a base 
year), time frames and/or periods for implementation, scope and coverage, planning 
processes, assumptions and methodological approaches including those for estimating and 
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accounting for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and, as appropriate, removals, and 
how the Party considers that its intended nationally determined contribution is fair and 
ambitious, in light of its national circumstances”.  
 
 
Figure 2. Progress of INDC Submissions. In October 2016 84 % of the Parties have submitted their INDC 
documents to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change according to the INDC Submission 
Portal. (UNFCCC 2016) 
 
Though the Parties were asked to submit their INDC documents prior to COP21, as seen in 
figure 2, according to INDC Submission Portal maintained by UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2016) 
only 162 Parties out of 190 have submitted theirs in October 2016 some ten months after the 
COP21. After ratification of the Paris Agreement, the word “intended” will be forgotten 
transforming the documents into Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) which 
countries will update progressively and expectantly ambitiously in every five years (UNFCCC 
2016). 
 
2. Background  
This chapter is divided in two parts. Firstly, it will focus on briefly explaining the 
contemporary international climate politics in order to improve the understanding of the 
global context. Secondly, it will take a closer look of China’s context and its climate policies. 
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2.1. Climate Politics after the Kyoto Protocol 
Bailey and Compston (2012) state that the Kyoto division was already in 1997 a strong 
simplification of the real positions of the countries. This argument is supported with the fact 
that non-Annex countries included a diversity of countries like South Korea, Singapore, 
China, Kuwait and Haiti (Durand 2012). The Protocol covered only some 30 percentages of 
the global emissions (Durand 2012) because for example the US never ratified it and the 
emerging nations like South Africa, Brazil, India and China were not given any binding 
reductions (Syri et al. 2013). In reality, the number was even lower since many of the Annex 
B countries never achieved the given reductions (Napoli 2012), and on the contrary, the 
emissions actually continued to grow in many OECD countries (Hurrell 2012).  
 
Coming into an agreement of the post-Kyoto time cleared not to be an easy task as the 
structure of the climate negotiations and the global political situation had changed remarkably 
since the founding of the Convention in 1992 (Brunnée & Streck 2013). Many argue that the 
negotiations were slowed down by the ambiguous understanding of the CBDRC principle 
(Vihma et al. 2011; Durand 2012; Brunnée & Streck 2013; Blaxekjær & Nielsen 2015). For 
example, China argued strongly for developing countries’ sovereign right to develop without 
agreeing on binding quotas and promoted developed countries to provide technology transfer 
and aid without tight conditions for developing countries (Chen 2012). Again, the developed 
countries like the US stated that they will not join an agreement based on the KP (Kemp 
2016). Different environmental NGOs were promoting a treaty with quantitative emission 
quotas for US, China and India (Chen 2012).  
 
The strong KP dichotomy of Annex B and non-Annex began to change into developed and 
developing countries in the atmosphere of COP13 in Bali in 2007. For the first time, climate 
action was requested from all Parties: mitigation commitments from developed and mitigation 
actions from developing countries (Brunnée & Streck 2013). The outcome of COP13 also 
urged Parties to come to an agreement by 2009 which probably led to the high expectations 
before COP15 in 2009 in Copenhagen.  
 
In the anxious atmosphere before the 2009 meeting even the emerging economies of Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China published their voluntary reduction goals (Hurrell 2012) which 
was seen as a sign of potential success in the meeting. However, COP15 came out only with a 
weak Copenhagen Accord, from which many blame the emerging nations’, especially China 
  10 
and India’s, negative attitude (Hallding et al. 2011; Hurrell 2012; Brunnée & Streck 2013). 
Despite the weak outcome, Copenhagen legacy can be seen for example in the strengthening 
position of the emerging nations (Hallding et al. 2011). 
 
In 2010s, the criticism of the KP dichotomy being too simple had become even more accurate 
with trends like increasing diversity within the developing country group and growing GHG 
emissions and economies of the emerging developing nations (figure 3). The world had 
become more multipolar and the economic and political power of the emerging powers had 
begun influencing the climate negotiations (Gomez-Echeverri 2013). For example, in 2006 
China passed the United States as the worst CO2 emitter measured in the absolute terms (kt) 
and currently India is on the third place on the list (World Bank 2016). In addition, according 
to the World Bank Data, in time of the COP17 in 2011, the four emerging nations mentioned 
earlier Brazil, South Africa, India and China were all in the top 15 on the list. However, 
despite their growing emissions, in 2011 Brazil, India and China were also in top 10 largest 
investors in renewable energy in the world (Gomez-Echeverri 2013). 
 
 
Figure 3. The Global Situation of GDP per capita and CO2 emissions (kt) in 2013. If compared to figure 1, 
the Annex B –countries can be recognized to some extent present the highest classes of GDP per capita in 2013, 
though there are many middle income countries especially in Latin America, Middle East and Asia. The five 
nations with highest absolute CO2 emissions were China, the US, India, Russia and Japan. High absolute 
emissions can be thought as one reason why China often refers to CO2 emissions per capita. With CO2 
emissions per capita indicator its emissions were only on the 45th place in 2013. (World Bank 2016; GADM 
2016) 
 
A clear shift in negotiations was visible in COP17 in 2011 in Durban. The outcome lacked the 
traditional notions of dichotomy, developed or developing countries and instead asked actions 
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from all Parties to “raise the level of ambition” (Hurrell 2012). In addition, the COP17 and 
COP18 decisions lack the conventional clause of the CBDRC principle (Brunnée & Streck 
2013). This development can be seen as a major shift in the UNFCCC negotiations, though 
the Parties’ were still officially negotiating under the principle as it is mentioned in the 
authentic text of Convention. 
 
The new breeze in climate negotiations is also seen in the structure of the negotiations. Dalby 
(2016b) states that the political groups were previously organized based on the dichotomies of 
Annex/non-Annex or developed/developing countries. Since 2009, the new political groups 
under the UNFCCC consisted increasingly of both, developed and developing countries 
(Blaxekjær & Nielsen 2015). These groupings have increased for example bilateral 
cooperation off the UN-track. This has further strengthened the bottom-up approach of the 
negotiations. However, the relevance and potential of these groupings under the UNFCCC 
regime is argued to be often ignored in academic and policy debates (Gomez-Echeverri 2013). 
This development is, however, redefining the past role of UNFCCC as an authority and 
changing it towards a coordinator of the negotiations (Betsill et al. 2015). 
 
In 2011 COP17 Durban the Parties agreed to commit to a new legally binding climate 
agreement by 2015 to be entered into force in 2020 (Roberts 2016). At this point, all eyes 
turned to Paris COP21 with expectations as great they were before Copenhagen’s meeting in 
2009. However, Vihma (2015) argues these two COPs to differ for example from the 
attitudes, cooperation and domestic policies of great powers. In 2014 China and US made an 
emission cutting agreement which Dalby (2016a) considers as the forerunner for the COP21 
and thinks is “a matter of significance to the contemporary geopolitics”. The fact that past 
climate actions have been inadequate is now more acknowledged. GHG emissions have 
continued to grow and even though the developed countries would cut all their emissions, it 
would be insufficient to stop the warming below 2℃ (Blaxekjær & Nielsen 2015; Vihma 
2015). Furthermore, the impacts of climate change are already felt. For example, year 2015 
was calculated as the warmest year on record (Roberts 2016). In addition, at this point it was 
evident to all the Parties that runaway climate change would compromise the development 
and well-being of humankind (Brunnée & Streck 2013). Paris meeting had also the potential 
to bring trust and believe on the UN negotiation track (Vihma 2015). Consequently, the 
process towards COP21 seemed to have a clear target in mind and in 2011 all the Parties were 
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welcomed to prepare and submit their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDCs) prior the COP21 meeting in 2015. 
 
2.1.1. Paris Agreement 
The UNFCCC and the Parties did deliver a historic climate agreement in 12th December 2015 
built on the Convention (Paris Agreement 2015). The significance of the agreement is argued 
with a statement: “it charts a new course in the global climate effort” (UNFCCC 2016). 
However, as the Paris Agreement relies on the national contributions, the long-term success of 
the agreement depends on the INDCs ability and ambition to answer the Paris agreement 
targets. Two main targets are to halt the global average temperature increase below 2℃ while 
attempting to limit it to 1.5℃ and reach net zero emissions after 2050 (World Resource 
Institute 2016). The Agreement opened for ratifications on 22nd April 2016 and entered into 
force on 4th November 2016 after reaching the threshold of being ratified by 55 Parties 
accounting for minimum 55% of the global emissions on 5th October 2016 (UNFCCC 2016). 
In a comparison to Kyoto Protocol, Paris requires 55% of all global emissions, when KP only 
noticed 55 % emission of industrialized emissions. In October 2016, the Agreement was 
ratified by 81 Parties (figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Parties ratified the Paris Agreement in October 2016. Paris Agreement is ratified especially by 
many island developing countries and small developing countries. Out of the five highest emitters in 2013 
presented in figure 3, only China, the US and India have ratified it. European Union has also ratified the 
Agreement in addition to the European countries’ domestic ratifications. (UNFCCC 2016; GADM 2016) 
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At this point, the agreement is credited for the symbolic value of Parties coming into 
agreement but criticized about the wide gap between the ambition of the INDCs and the actual 
targets of the agreement (Blaxekjær & Nielsen 2015). This criticism answers to Brunnée and 
Streck’s (2013) earlier mentioned point of how the bottom-up approach may not reach 
sufficient ambition to tackle climate change. As the total impact of Paris Agreement and the 
INDCs can at this point only be estimated, one suggestion is that though the INDCs will lower 
the GHG emissions, with this ambition the global average temperature will increase by some 
2.6-3.1℃ by 2100 (Rogelj et al. 2016). As the COP is organized under the Convention, it is 
bound to the principles of the authentic text from 1992. However, though for example the 
CBDRC principle is mentioned, it is not highlighted in the context of burden sharing but for 
example in the context of INDCs with a clause:    
      
Each Party's successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression 
beyond the Party's then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its 
highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.  
         (Paris Agreement 2015) 
 
 
2.1.2. The Diversity of Developing Countries 
Though there has been a shift in discussing the dichotomy, the developed and developing 
countries are still strongly present in the climate negotiations and also in the Paris Agreement. 
The Kyoto dichotomy has been constructed on a static dichotomy which has proven to be 
surprisingly persistent. For example the UNFCCC website (2016) still divides countries into 
Annex B and non-Annex countries in 2016 though this dichotomy is not mentioned in the 
Paris Agreement. Climate politics needs to consider the global 21st century changing 
dynamics (World Resource Institute 2016).  
 
Developing countries share a structuralist world view according to which inequality is 
commanding the global society. Especially, the group of G-77 is often said to share a common 
developing country identity. The felt inequality has created a common identity of “We are not 
the North”.  This Thirdworldism influences climate politics through the developing countries’ 
claims for historical responsibility of the developed countries and equal per capita rights. 
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However, Thirdworldism can be argued to be under construction since the place “Third 
World” is changing because of the emerging nations (Sidaway 2011). Sidaway’s comment is 
highly relative for this research as the hypothesis is that China’s developing country identity 
would have changed. (Vihma et al. 2011) 
 
Figure 5. G-77 Member states in 2016. Though China is not an official member of G-77 group, on their 
website China is listed as a member state. If compared to figure 1, the Kyoto dichotomy can be recognized from 
this map since most of the G-77 member states were also non-Annex countries. (The Group of 77 2016; GADM 
2016) 
  
The G-77 is one of the major groups in climate politics as it has 133 members and covers over 
2/3 of world’s nations (figure 5). However, since the group of developing countries is getting 
more diverse, the interests of the group conflict more and the common identity will 
moderately deteriorate questioning the practicality of the group in climate negotiations 
(Blaxekjær & Nielsen 2015). Thus, it should not be generalized that all developing countries 
promote business-as-usual model or dislike legally binding quotas, as the national opinions 
vary greatly. Differing opinions have led to a situation of where one Party is often negotiating 
in many different subgroups like China is part of many groups like BASIC countries, US-
China bilateral negotiations and G-77 & China. This research focuses only on China’s 
position in the BASIC countries and the bilateral cooperation with the US. However, though 
not the focus point of this research, G-77 & China is relevant for this research because of its 
close contact with BASIC countries. China is not an official member of the G-77 but Vihma 
et al. (2011) argue it to be a “very close ‘associate’ or ‘invitee’. China has been formally 
  15 
negotiating among the G-77 in climate negotiations and in the UNFCCC context the coalition 
is called G-77 & China.  
2.2. China’s Climate Policy 
Eva (2003) argues China to be different from other cultures because of its vast land area, the 
large population and long history. This single-party communist country has been a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council with veto rights since 1971 and can in this regard be held 
as one of five most powerful countries in the world (ibid.). However, the size of the nation 
brings also regional challenges. For example Agnew (2010) and Chen (2012) argue China to 
deal with huge inequalities between the rich, emission-intensive and advanced coastal regions 
in the East and around Beijing and less developed regions in western China. Chen compares 
China’s domestic situation to be a miniature of the global relations.  
 
China’s climate policy is uniquely centralized to National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This causes environmental 
concerns to be scattered around different ministries. Environmental approach has still been 
criticized to be a rather remote issue to the NDRC. Thus, the Chinese climate actions cannot 
be comprehensively explained by the awareness of climate change vulnerability. Also, 
China’s location mostly in temperate zone makes it less vulnerable in a comparison to for 
example developing countries in tropical or littoral regions. (Chen 2012) 
 
 
Figure 6. China’s CO2 emissions from 1966 to 2013. The figure shows China’s emissions from both used 
indicators: in kilotons and in relation to capita. Though, with China’s huge population, its emissions per capita 
are still relatively low but with both indicators, the trend is clearly rising especially from 2002 onwards. (World 
Bank 2016) 
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China can be argued to attract great attention in climate politics because of its share of the 
global emissions and the continuing growth of the emissions (Chen 2012) which can be also 
seen in figure 6. Chen argues China’s total energy consumption and carbon emissions to have 
started to grow in 2001 when China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). This 
directed the country towards heavy and chemical industries instead of centralizing to modern 
technologies. China’s emissions have grown also because of huge infrastructure projects like 
the Three Gorges Dam (Chen 2012). These claim are supported by figures 6 and 7. In figure 6 
the trend of emissions is especially steeper from 2002 onwards than in the 1990s. Industries 
were calculated to have added 41 % value to China’s GDP in 2013 (figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 7. China’s economic structure based on the percentages of value added of GDP in 2013. Chen 
(2012) said China’s WTO membership has guided the country towards heavy and chemical industries which can 
be seen also in this relation as the industry and services covers nearly 100 percentages. (World Bank 2016)  
 
Despite its large emissions, China is the leading investor and largest manufacturer in 
renewable energy technology and endeavoring to increase the share of renewable energy 
sources up to 20% before 2030 (Gomez-Echeverri 2013; Kaivo-oja 2014). From the 
electricity production perspective, renewables covered 4 % in 2013 (figure 8). One successful 
example is China’s leapfrogging the developed countries in solar panel manufacturing being 
now the world’s largest manufacturer (Chen 2012). On the other hand, the growing energy 
demand exceeds the supply and China struggles with its energy security. It will not able to 
cover its future energy demand with domestic resources (Odgaard & Delman 2014). This 
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forces China to increase its non-renewable energy capacity at the same time. This puts China 
into an interesting position: it can be argued to be the leader in renewable energy and the 
worst emitter in the near future. Neither of which, at least not in the past, are considered the 
features of a developing country in climate politics. 
 
 
Figure 8. The sources of electricity production in China in 2013. Though the renewable sector is increasing 
China still receives 77 % of the production from oil, gas and coal, out of which 75% were from coal in 2013. 
(World Bank 2016)  
 
China’s climate policy is part of its energy and environmental strategy which is motivated by 
economic growth targets (Chen 2012). Chen (2012: 1) estimates the policy making to be 
“more likely driven by its intense attention to energy security, business opportunities in 
emerging green industries and its international image in global climate politics”. China’s 
perception of development is interesting, for example Atanossava-Cornelis (2012) state that in 
Chinese context development is seen as “basis for solving all problems”.  
 
In the National Climate Change Programme (2007) China clears the awareness of climate 
change by stating that “it is an issue involving both environment and development, but it is 
ultimately an issue of development” (China’s National Climate Change Programme 2007: 2). 
In the same document China describes itself as a developing country of responsibility and as a 
developing country with a low development stage. This term is changed into “world’s largest 
developing country” in China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change 
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(CPAACC 2013) and in 12th Five Year Plan for 2011-2015 (2011). In these documents, 
however, climate change is not only presented as a great challenge facing China but they also 
state how the country is planning to “positively respond to global climate change”.  
 
In the highlights of the 13th Five Year Plan (Xinhua 2015) China is granted for its progress 
over the past five years as it has turned into the second largest global economy. The goals for 
the 2016-2020 are environmentally ambitious for example promoting clean production, 
setting up a green and low-carbon industry, establishing a green development fund, setting up 
a nationwide environmental monitoring system and promoting new energy vehicles. Five 
Year Plans have typically been about ensuring China’s development and economic growth but 
in the 13th Five Year Plan the climate targets are strongly included in the five year plan. 
 
One of the perks of combining the energy policy and development strategy is that China has 
managed to create ambitious policies to tackle both, the climate change and national energy 
security, with the same actions (Chen 2012). These policies have been driven also by the 
“domestic co-benefits such as reducing air pollution, improving energy security and gaining 
an economic advantage in the renewable energy industry” (Kemp 2016). 
 
2.2.1. The INDC of China 
China submitted their comprehensive some 40 pages long INDC document on 30th June 
2015. The document promised for instance following goals: 1) to peak by 2030 and do its best 
to peak early, 2) to lower CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 60 % to 65 % from the 2005 
level, 3) to increase the non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption around 20 % and 4) to 
increase the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic meters on the 2005 level. The 
INDC document clearly highlights the principle of CBDRC and addresses the significant 
impact developed countries have had on the emissions. The document mentions the 
dichotomy of developing and developed countries many times and China is frequently argued 
to be a developing country. This is interesting in a comparison for example with the 11th Five 
Year Plan where the word “developing country” is mentioned once.  
 
In the INDC, China describes itself as a responsible developing country like Kopra (2013) 
suggested and from that perspective China considers to do more than a developing country 
should. For example, the document explains the success of a number of goals set in 2009 
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being achieved by 2014. It also mentions other developing countries in the context of willing 
to increase the South-South cooperation and China’s assistance for other developing countries 
including small island nations, the least developed countries and African countries. As 
motives for cooperation, China mentions the domestic need for sustainable development and 
the will to ensure economic, energy, ecological and food security and people’s health in 
addition to their willingness for global cooperation.  
 
What is interesting in the document, is that China refers to development as stages. For 
example they agree on “participate in international commitments that match its development 
stage”. In addition, the document reveals China’s ambitious goals to be “moderately 
prosperous society in an all-round way by 2020 and to create a prosperous, strong, 
democratic, culturally developed and harmonious modern socialist country by 2050”. These 
kind of comments make China’s development sound ambitiously planned and not only aiming 
for economic growth but to have the whole society at some certain level by 2050. This claim 
can be supported with China’s five year plans. 
 
2.2.2. China’s Geopolitical Position 
Atanassova-Cornelis (2012) divides the development of Chinese identity into three phases: 
being a victim in the past, currently a developing country and a great power in the future. Eva 
(2003) distinguishes the Chinese self-esteem to be based on community, nationalism and a 
sense of uniqueness. According to Eva, Chinese community consists of for example 
appreciation of the leaders’ roles and authorities and tight networks which result into 
integration processes based on division between “us” and “them” (them being often 
foreigners). These two identities mentioned by Atanassova-Cornelis will be shortly discussed 
next, firstly taking a look at China’s developing country identity and then its position as a 
possible rising great power. 
 
China’s identity is said to be in line and shared with other developing countries as 
oppositional to the Global North and as a victim of western imperialism (Varrall 2013). This 
supports earlier mentioned concept of Third World identity and felt inequality in contrast to 
the North (Vihma et al. 2011). The status of a developing country is often defined in 
economic terms, for example the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines 
developing countries by their eligibility for official development aid (ODA) (DAC 2016). 
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From the perspective of this research it is interesting that China wishes to be identified as “a 
developing country in partnership with other developing countries” instead of being a donor 
(Varrall 2013). Varrall argues this framing to highlight mutual benefit, win-win cooperation 
and China’s wish to help developing countries to get a louder voice in the unequal global 
relations.  
 
Besides having a developing country identity, the economic growth of China can be argued to 
promote the ideas of a rising great power. China’s economy has been continued to grow 
despite of the global economic crisis (figure 9). Eva (2003) emphasizes China’s economic 
power and business skills which it uses cautiously to gain important positions and 
international recognition. This, Eva describes as China’s ability to define its strategies and 
recognize the time to act.  
 
 
Figure 9. China’s GDP per capita in current US dollars and its GDP growth annually as percentages from 
1966 to 2015. China’s has been clearly above 5 % despite the global economic crisis in 2008, though it has 
slowed down a little. GDP per capita has continued to grow in addition that the population is growing at the 
same time. (World Bank 2016)  
 
The power balance between US and China is probably one of the most researched topics in 
international relations and with the variety of the debate one could easily argue every side. 
Agnew (2010) questions this whole setting that China would have all of a sudden re-entered 
world politics challenging the US to be a little out of its context. Also, Atanassova-Cornelis 
(2012) efforts to explain the bigger relative picture of how actually the way the world has 
dealt with the growth of China, has had an effect on China’s self-perception as a rising power. 
  21 
According to Atanassova-Cornelis, the identity of being a great power has not been strictly 
defined domestically but rather being based on being a rising great power in relation to other 
major powers. As this question is too large for this research, the intention is to limit the Sino-
American relations solely to their bilateral climate cooperation.  
 
From this perspective, however, it is important to point out that for example Eva (2003), 
Agnew (2010) and Atanassova-Cornelis (2012) all talk about China’s will towards a larger 
political role. Eva (2003) taking this even as far as China’s aim for “becoming the epicenter of 
the world”. In this regard, Varrell’s (2013) idea is fascinating how China could be defined as 
a great power, but it would not automatically mean that it would act like expected from a 
great power.  
 
3. Theoretical Frame 
This chapter is divided into three parts. It will begin by introducing critical geopolitics and 
continue by discussing climate geopolitics. Lastly, the chapter will discuss the theory of 
geopolitical identity. 
3.1. Critical Geopolitics  
The term “geopolitics”, originally used by Rudolph Kjellen in 1899, was primarily affiliated 
to imperialist power politics with early key intellectuals like Karl Haushofer, Halford 
Mackinder and Alfred Mahan (Castree 2008). The precise definition of geopolitics is 
challenging to find (for example Ó Tuathail & Agnew 1992; Castree 2008) but for instance Ó 
Tuathail and Agnew place it as “geography of international politics” which is interested in the 
relationship between physical geography and foreign policy. This relationship is clearly 
visible in this research as climate change represents the physical geography side and the aim 
is to understand how and why China behaves in a particular way in its climate policy trying to 
find solutions to combat the phenomenon. Ó Tuathail (1998a) captures the difference of 
international politics and geopolitics to the term “balance of power”. In international politics 
states’ interest and urge for power is considered the “norm” whereas geopolitics is more 
interested in finding the solutions or requirements for a stability within nations.  
 
This traditional geopolitics, often referred as classical geopolitics, has gained its fair share of 
criticism especially because of the associations with Nazism (Newman 1998). Overall, the 
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criticism could be summarized in three perceptions. Firstly, the critics have argued for the 
authority of geopolitics to explain world politics neutrally since in reality it can hardly be free 
from the influences. Rather it is actually produced within world politics, not on an abstract, 
isolated frame (Ó Tuathail 1998a). Though, at the same time it needs to be acknowledged that 
critical geopolitics can by no means be above geopolitics in this matter but efforts to be aware 
of this thus creating possibilities to rethink and reconstruct geopolitics (Ó Tuathail & Dalby 
1994). The second perception concentrates on the simplistic worldview of geopolitics trying 
to explain the global order relying only on one geographical factor at a time (Nayef 2009). For 
example, the countries were typically classified as sea or land powers (Agnew 2010). Thirdly, 
classical geopolitics has been criticized of having an emphasis on western geopolitical 
imaginations and polities (Atkinson & Dodds 2000). 
 
Partly, as an effort to answer this criticism, there was a change in geopolitical thinking by the 
end of Cold War, which resulted in “critical geopolitical thinking” in 1980s in the footsteps of 
two political geographers, Simon Dalby and Gearoid Ó Tuathail (Atkinson & Dodds 2000). 
Instead of only focusing on geographical factors, critical geography is positioned across 
disciplinary boundaries (Ó Tuathail & Dalby 1994) and researches “the discursive nature of 
geopolitical maneuvering and the way in which global positioning is represented and 
contested (Newman 1998). Though, it has been suggested that the “critical” should be 
removed from the name as it is the basic nature of science to be critical (Harle & Moisio 
2000).  
 
In the modern world-system the states were seen in competing against each other’s. Agnew 
(2010) questions this modern geopolitical imagination for example to lack the notions of 
evolution. Countries are not the only ones creating the world politics but the environment 
where they function is under constant change regardless of their interests (ibid.). This 
questions the linear path of modern geopolitical imagination and the idea of power being 
always operated at someone’s expense (Nye 2013). However, redefining power is a slow 
process but the idea of power to be “diffused, decentered and networked” has already found 
place next to the centralized concept (Allen 2008: 95; Wallerstein 2010). Agnew (2010) has 
been researching China from the perspective of this criticism and states that China can not 
only be seen as “just the next hegemonic power” but not as a totally new development path 
either. Agnew reminds that if focused only on China’s economic and military power, one will 
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lose the sight of the overall situation where China’s powerfulness will be affected by other 
forces and nations as well.  
 
Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992) argue against the fact that geopolitics would be in principally 
interested in actions taken but rather attempts to discover the discourses behind the actions. 
Thus, the critical geopolitical research often investigates language, visual images and political 
performance (economic and political practices) (Agnew 2010). Only through metaphors, 
visions and frameworks, state’s actions in the world-system can be understood in a 
meaningful way (Ó Tuathail & Agnew 1992; Ó Tuathail 1998a). 
 
Critical geopolitics have been most affected by the influence of Foucault’s idea that power, 
discourse and geopolitics are closely tied (Dodds & Sidaway 1994). Ó Tuathail has said that 
“We all live in a world shaped by the prevailing hegemony of certain geopolitical discourses 
over others”, thus the geopolitics aims at revealing and questioning the power relations 
through discourses. On a global level, the powerful nations like the United States and 
especially the statecraft influence strongly the representation of the political space for the rest 
of the international community (Ó Tuathail & Agnew 1992). Because people’s understanding 
of the social world is created through the socially constructed use of language and practices, 
the discourses used in political speeches or documents, reveal something about the worldview 
and understanding of the statecraft of the particular nation (Ó Tuathail 1998a; Ó Tuathail & 
Agnew 1992). The discourses used by the statecraft rise from the national context of 
narratives about the state formation and identity (Ó Tuathail 1998). Thus, though it often 
seems that geopolitics would only research words by a small elite, the discourses are 
structured in the cultural context.  
 
Next, environmental problems and politics will be discussed from the perspective of critical 
geopolitics.  
 
3.2. Geopolitics of Climate Change 
Since the World War II, global environmental questions have become an important part of the 
geopolitical agenda since, for example, climate change is considered to be a national and 
international security challenge (Dalby 1998, 2014). This Dalby argues to be a consequence 
of the realization that humanity can have an impact on the natural processes of global 
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environment. In the Conceptual Framing on Climate Change risk of climate impacts are 
consequences of hazards, vulnerabilities and exposures IPCC (2014).  
 
Agnew (2010) stresses the importance of researching the environment with critical 
geopolitics, as the global power structures have contributed geographical inequalities and 
environmental problems. These developments are consequences of globalization of 
environmental problems. This globalization has diminished the integrity of sovereign states’ 
borders and urged nations to assign some of their sovereign rights to global level actors (in 
climate policy context for example to UNFCCC). In addition, the globalization has blurred the 
line between national and global environmental challenges and encouraged nations to engage 
in transnational environmental actions. This kind of development is visible in the UNFCCC 
process of negotiating solution for climate change between over 170 sovereign states. (Castree 
2008) 
 
Environmental problems also pose a security threat to societies because for example lack of 
resources can cause potential tensions and conflicts. For instance, regional inequalities and the 
potentiality of environmental challenges like accelerated industrialization and urbanization 
can escalate the already existing political tensions in China and cause major conflicts (Dalby 
1998). This domestic pressure changes China’s geopolitical position as it makes environment 
so closely linked to its security. With a solution to climate change, China could possibly solve 
some domestic questions, too. However, Dalby (2013) warns of generalizing that 
environmental change would lead directly to a tension. In his view, “climate security in the 
long run is not a matter of environmental change causing political difficulties, but rather a 
matter of contemporary political difficulties causing accelerating climate change.” This 
increases the relevance of researching the political debate in the context of climate change. 
 
The way environmental problems are discussed, represents socially constructed use of 
language (Feindt and Oels 2005). Therefore, there are multiple combating interpretations, 
especially in global problems like climate change. The argumentation in environment politics 
is built on how the problems are defined and described (Dalby 1998). Geopolitical 
environmental discourses (GEDS) try to identify the assumed problems and highlight which 
actors can be held as the sources and solvers of the problem (Agnew & Corbridge 1995). 
Feindt and Oels (2005) list that climate change has been identified for instance, as an 
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economic and security question but also as a global issue which stresses the importance for 
global solution.  
 
The different descriptions of climate change affect the idea how it should be answered (Feindt 
& Oels 2005; Castree 2008; Dalby 2016). Nations frame the environmental discourses by 
including topics suitable for their interests and excluding the ones not on their agenda (Dalby 
2016). In addition to discourses, geopolitical environmental practices (GEPS) are also crucial 
in environmental geopolitics. GEPS capture nation’s for example diplomatic, administrative 
and financial means of how it answers to environmental problems (Castree 2008). An actor 
with particular geopolitical environmental discourses and practices can be understood as a 
discourse-practice regime. This research applies Castree’s (2008) environmental geopolitics 
frame which will now be explained in the context of climate change. 
 
3.2.1. A Frame for Climate Change Geopolitics 
The critical environmental geopolitics frame by Castree (2008) was applied in this research to 
climate change context, particularly to China’s climate policy (figure 10). The frame 
summarizes the idea of climate discourse-practice regimes. Out of correspondence with 
relevant literature, the terms GEDS and GEPS have been maintained in the same form as in 
Castree’s original frame.  
 
The arrows in figure 10 show how interrelated geopolitical environmental discourses (GEDS) 
and geopolitical environmental practices (GEPS) are. They are in constant interaction: on the 
other hand, a particular discourse may lead into setting new practices but on the other hand 
the outcome of the practices may cause the regime to rethink or reform their discourses. The 
topic of this research can be placed under practical environmental geopolitics as it is 
researching Chinese foreign policy. However, in itself, this research is formal environmental 
geopolitics as it is investigating the Chinese geopolitical identity according to academic 
principles.  
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Figure 10. Applied Framework for climate change geopolitics. The frame is based on the Castree’s critical 
environmental geopolitics framework. This research is interested in practical geopolitics as it focuses on foreign 
policy. The research in itself represents critical, formal geopolitics. (Castree 2008: 428) 
 
The frame is utilized in this research, as the two main research problems are part of the frame: 
environmental geopolitical imagination guides the geopolitical representations of self and 
others. Like nations, also the discourse-practice regimes frame climate change differently, 
which creates alternative climate geopolitical maps of the world. The idea of discourse-
practice regime is applied to the two coalitions China has been negotiating, the BASIC 
countries and the US-China bilateral cooperation. 
 
Castree has evaluated discourse-practice regimes based on their nature. He has divided 
regimes into four characters: declaratory, promotional, implementation and enforcement. 
Declaratory regime expresses the need to form a regime and promotional one actively 
encourages building of a regime. When these ones cover the regime creation, the 
implementation regime develops common environmental discourses and practices. The 
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enforcement one establishes the GEDS and GEPS in practice. Castree points out that though 
the overall amount of environmental regimes has been increasing, the number of enforcement 
regimes is far behind of the three other ones.  
  
3.3. Geopolitical Identity 
According to critical geopolitics, the spaces in international relations are produced, which 
means that geography in world politics is socially constructed (Moisio 2015). Critical 
geopolitics attempts to pinpoint the spatial assumptions in the international politics (ibid.) 
which is also the objective of this research. This constructing of spaces is also known as 
“earth labeling” which basically means that regions are positioned as oppositional such as 
“us” and “them” (Ó Tuathail 1998a). Geopolitical narratives are often framed as 
confrontations. There is a border of inside and outside which is partly creating the political 
identity (Agnew 2010). The national and local are constructed by “the experience and 
imagination of the foreign” (Ó Tuathail 1994). Dalby’s (2008) comment supports this, as he 
claims that geopolitics tends to order these kind of blocs according to their relative global 
importance. Hence, geopolitics has potential to create and project how the world political map 
and world affairs will look in the future (Ó Tuathail 1998a). Earth labeling to opposite camps 
can be applied to this research as setting the dichotomy of developed and developing 
countries into being the “us” and “them”. However, while acknowledging these kind of 
dichotomies like developing and developed, there is a risk that the critical geopolitical 
analysis will settle for this weak notion of states producing confrontations without efforts for 
more understanding (Ó Tuathail 1994).  
 
The ideas of dividing the world into for example North and South are as much constructed 
ideas of places than as geographical facts (Power 2003). Comprehensive understanding of 
these places requires a critical geopolitics of development as the Third World discourses are 
somewhat reproducing the inequalities of the colonial era. The articulation of development is 
crucial as the Third World is produced through language and “the discourses results in 
concrete practices of thinking and acting” (Escobar 1995: 11). Critical geopolitics is interested 
in the evolution of development theory as it is closely linked to the changing ideas of 
development and structuring places like the North and South (Dodds & Sidaway 1994). One 
example of the evolution of development theories is the Rostow’s four stage growth model 
which divides the development into five stages comparing them to the taking off on an 
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airplane (Willis 2005). According to Willis, the Rostow’s development path has later been 
criticized of being too Eurocentric as it expects all regions to develop similar path than the 
North.  
 
Newman (2000) has been researching the geopolitical imagination of Israel and according to 
him, nations do not have a stable location in the geopolitical structure. Nation’s geopolitical 
imagination is a compromise between the identities of political elites, citizens and other 
national actors. Thus, the nation’s geopolitical imagination is determined from within. From 
this perspective, this research seems irrelevant as the aim is to study China’s geopolitical 
identity but there was no fieldwork nor focusing on the domestic context. Though, this would 
have been interesting, this research is limited to focus more on China’s geopolitical position 
in the global climate change context. This choice is made based on Newman’s claim that the 
actual position of a country is mostly decided externally 
 
Atwood (1972: 17) provides a practical example of this by claiming that “in an unknown 
place it is easier to ask where am I, rather than who am I?” This argument is justified with the 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion similar to the ideas of labeling “us” and “them”. To 
understand where some nation is, the aim is not to understand the geographical location but 
the relative identity political position (Harle & Moisio 2000). If only asked who, one could 
not tackle the political context. Harle and Moisio name this identity project as an effort to 
understand which place is felt as their own by the nation itself but also to understand which 
place they wish the others to place them. According to them, this question could not be 
explained with classical geopolitics, and hence this research is also written based on critical 
geopolitics.   
 
Identity is also produced by writing security, as security threats are not built solely on actual 
threats but produced in security political discourses (Campbell 1992). This point is interesting 
as the environmental problems were earlier referred as security issues by Dalby (1998). 
Geopolitical threats are built through language (Harle & Moisio 2000). As geopolitical threat 
is defined coming from outside, it is creating the boundaries of the community. However, 
though nations try to build confrontations based on these kind of traditional threats, this 
setting is becoming old-fashioned and for example environmental threats can now be defined 
also producing identity via their role as security threats (ibid.).  Harle and Moisio represent a 
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possibility to analyze security threats with three dimensions: problem, threat and credibility. 
This idea will be utilized in the results of this research. 
 
States view others through their geopolitical imagination, and inclusion of a specific nation to 
an economic or political union is decided by the international community and superpowers in 
relation to their own imaginations (Newman 2000). This would mean that other nations’ 
geopolitical imaginations are the most influencing factors in China’s geopolitical position in 
climate negotiations. Therefore, self-image gains rather crucial role as it is “the image one 
wants to export and display in relations with others” (Eva 2003: 2). Harle and Moisio (2000) 
recognize the identity building process to often be a product of what one wishes not to be.  
 
Nation’s geopolitical imagination can be conflicting with the other nations’ ideas (Newman 
2000). This can cause tensions when nation wants the others to position it in a certain way. In 
China’s case this matter is interesting for example in the context of developing country 
identity. Is China a developing country according to its own and other nations’ geopolitical 
imaginations? To summarize, geopolitical identity is always defined in a relation to others and 
in a specific context, thus making it a social construction. As identity is socially constructed 
and never pre-given, redefining one’s identity is always possible (Campbell 1992; Ó Tuathail 
1998b). Newman explains this transformation by changes within the nation’s identity and in 
the global position. Harle and Moisio (2000) describe the position to be in a constant move as 
it needs continually to be justified to oneself and to others. Hence, there is a possibility to 
alternative, counter-identities as well.  
 
What is noteworthy, is that also the positions of other states change within the international 
political space. Thus, there are no right or permanent answers to a country’s geopolitical 
position. Yet, the position can be discussed and tried to be represented. Newman (2000) has 
described Israel’s geopolitical position with two questions of who is an Israeli and where is 
Israel? He has tried to answer the who –question with discourses and tackle the where -
question with discussing the location in relation to other locations. This question setting is 
interesting in the case of China and it will be applied in the analysis in order to understand 
who and where China is in climate politics. As identity and environmental problems were 
both proven to be social constructions in this chapter, a little space will be awarded to social 
constructionism later in chapter 5.1.  
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4. China and the Research Frames  
China’s participation in climate cooperation is particularly critical because of its economic 
growth, increased total energy consumption and high carbon emissions. China’s international 
image has changed dramatically in 2010s because these trends have accelerated the 
expectations for China to take more international responsibilities in climate change context. 
However, in a comparison to the US, China has been seen active because of the withdrawal of 
the US from the Kyoto Protocol. (Chen 2012) 
 
China has been strongly rejecting to accept legally binding targets for emissions reductions. 
This has further increased the questions of fairness considering China’s rapid emission growth 
rates. It is seen unlikely that China would agree on legally binding targets anytime soon (Chen 
2012; Kopra 2013). Partially because of its economic interests but also because China does 
not accept outside interferences to its domestic policies or challenging the authority of the 
Communist Party (Eva 2003). Though, China understands that with claims like not accepting 
legally binding targets, its international image will be further harmed (Chen 2012). This is 
partly why Chen (2012: 12) suggests that China is endeavoring “more support and sympathy 
from both developed and developing countries”. These means have included diplomatic 
relations, agreeing on voluntary actions and attempting to reach zero carbon growth by 2050.  
 
China’s first National Program on Climate Change was published in 2007. The program 
presents a good example of Eva’s (2003) earlier mentioned point of China’s ability to know 
when to act. The National Program answered to the international critic of China’s 
irresponsibility. In the document, China cleared their awareness of the problem and promised 
voluntary targets for energy consumption (China’s National Climate Change Programme 
2007). However, China was unable to commit binding emission targets because of the coal-
dominated energy structure and low per capita income levels (Chen 2012). In the 12th Five 
Year Plan for 2011-2015 (2011), China states that they will provide assistance to developing 
countries in the climate change challenges.  
 
Chen (2012) has argued for two points in 2012 that has been accurate in the contemporary 
Chinese climate politics. Firstly, if US were to change its position, China would have to 
rethink its strategy. Secondly, China is interested in bilateral and multilateral cooperation, 
though in theory China participates in the UN-track negotiations. For example, in CPAACC 
(2013) it is stated that China has strengthened cooperation with the BASIC countries in 
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addition to “bilateral ministerial-level negotiations with developed countries including the 
United States, EU and Australia on climate change, to engage in extensive dialogues on 
climate change international negotiations, domestic climate change policies and related 
practical cooperation”. The interest in bilateral negotiations is supported by the Sino-
American climate cooperation began in the 2013 (White House 2014). China had clearly 
rethought its tactics when the two countries came out with a climate agreement in November 
2014 gaining a lot of attention from the international community.  
 
In 2015 China was already seen as one of the most active countries leading the road towards 
Paris. In Paris, under the UNFCCC China was negotiating with the coalition of BASIC 
countries meaning Brazil, South Africa, India and China. In addition, during 2015 China was 
negotiating with more bilateral means with the US. China does not have the required power to 
gain support of all developing or developed countries and is thus compelled to balance and 
compromise between different frames (Chen 2012). As this research is based on the 
comparison between these two frames, they will be presented next. 
4.1. The BASIC Frame 
 
Figure 11. Location of the BASIC Countries. BASIC countries consist of Brazil, South Africa, India and 
China.  (GADM 2016) 
 
The four countries Brazil, South Africa, India and China were in a relatively similar position 
in climate politics in 2009 because of their growing emissions, emerging economies and Non-
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Annex statuses (Hallding et al. 2011). They decided to found a coalition called the BASIC 
countries (Vihma et al. 2011) (figure 11). Besides the COPs, the bloc’s environment ministers 
have held meetings four times a year since 2009 (Hallding et al. 2011). During that time, two 
main trends have been the urge to have a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
and promote and sustain close ties with the G-77 group (Hallding et al. 2011).  
 
The economic and geopolitical importance of these four countries is increasingly 
strengthening (ibid.). One example of their current power is the news that in COP15 in 2009 
the actual outcome called Copenhagen Accord was eventually negotiated among BASIC 
countries and the US (Blaxekjær & Nielsen 2015). The countries have had cooperation before 
the BASIC coalition, for example Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are also 
known as the BRICS founded in 2001 (Blaxekjær & Nielsen 2015). However, BRICS has 
been founded with a more financial motive, to create balance to the US dominated world 
economy. BASIC bloc has (at least this far) had purely climate related interests. 
 
BASIC coalition has often seen as a subgroup for the developing country bloc G-77 as all 
these four countries are included in G-77 as well. Membership of the G-77 has brought them a 
certain “developing country status”. It is in the desire of BASIC countries to be understood as 
part of the G-77 group (for example Hallding et al. 2011; Chen 2012). However, already the 
wish to be distinguished as their own coalition, is a clear new development in climate politics. 
Hallding et al. describe the position of BASIC countries as sliding between the developing 
and developed world. According to Hallding et al., one of the motives of the coalition is to try 
to highlight that they are not part of neither.  
 
Since drafting Kyoto Protocol, the emissions of these four countries have increased 
remarkably (figure 12 & figure 13). This has made the dichotomy question more complex. 
Some of the developed nations have set a condition for their participation to be emission 
reductions by these countries (Hallding et al. 2011). Figure 12 shows that in 2013, the CO2 
emissions of BASIC countries counted for 37 % of the global emissions.  
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Figure 12. Relative shares of CO2 emissions in BASIC countries and in other countries in 2013. BASIC 
countries covered for 37 % of the CO2 emissions in 2013. (World Bank 2016) 
 
Though BASIC countries have common features, their differences have complicated the 
efforts to forecast their future as a coalition. For example, in figure 13 one can recognize that 
China’s growth is much steeper than the others’. The growth of China can jeopardize the joint 
views of the bloc or as more nations consider China as a developed country (Hallding et al. 
2011). NGOs have been worried of China setting a bad example for countries whose 
emissions are estimated to increase like India and South Africa (Chen 2012). Though, if 
China would pose a good example, then it might have strong positive consequences as well.  
 
 
Figure 13. CO2 Emissions per capita in the BASIC countries between 1960 and 2013.  The emissions have 
been growing in all four countries, there has been a decreasing trend only in South Africa from 2010 onwards. 
The CO2 emissions are difficult to compare since for example the population growth in India is higher which 
naturally influences the per capita indicator. (World Bank 2016) 
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Hallding et al. (2011) estimate that whether as one bloc or as four nations, they will 
strengthen their position in climate policy in the future. Their growth of importance in other 
sectors have been forecasted in multiple researches since 2011. For example, the term BRICS 
has originally born from the estimation that the combined GDPs of the five countries will 
bypass the G-7 countries’ by 2050. Though BRICS is a different bloc, it includes all the 
BASIC countries. Hence, these kind of estimations tell something about the future of BASIC 
countries as well.  
 
4.2. The US-China Frame 
Climate cooperation between China and US can be argued to have begun as late as 2013. 
However, Eva (2003) explains the relationship between the two countries to have longer 
history as for example the Americans have wanted to establish economic and commercial 
relations with China for long. In 21st century their economies are interdependent (Agnew 
2010; Atanassova-Cornelis 2012).  
 
In political sense, Eva (2003) argues their relations to have become tighter after Beijing 
shared their diplomatic support to the war on terrorism after the attacks on September 11th in 
2001. After the era of Bush administration, Obama has considered the Sino-American 
cooperation highly important and even as “shaping the twenty-first century” (Atanassova-
Cornelis 2012). Atanassova-Cornelis considers this cooperation to benefit in addition to the 
two nations also global level. The increased cooperation can also be held as a recognition of 
China as an economic, political and security partner. This development is rather new since 
according to Eva, China acknowledges the superiority of the US but wants to be considered as 
equal. Thus, the US is the key in the process of China’s identity balancing between a 
developing country and a rising great power (Atanassova-Cornelis 2012). 
 
The Sino-American relation is dynamic and also influenced greatly by the US political 
situation. For example, under the Obama administration, the US has been rather active and 
given a $3 billion dollar pledge to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), submitted its INDC 
document to the UNFCCC in addition to the bilateral climate dialogue with China (Kemp 
2016). However, as the Republican Party in the US has, at least until this far, not supported 
active international climate policy (Kemp 2016), the presidential elections in 2016 will have a 
significant impact on the global climate negotiations. The Paris Agreement is formatted in a  
  35 
 
Figure 14. The Shares of CO2 emissions in the US, China and Other Countries in 2013. US and China 
covered for 43 % of the global emissions in 2013. China’s share is the largest globally. (World Bank 2016) 
 
way permitting a presidential-executive agreement without congressional approval. Though, 
the US signed the agreement in 2016, there is always a possibility that the new President will 
withdraw from the agreement (Kemp 2016). Thus, Kemp describes the Paris Agreement as 
“vulnerable for the US withdrawal” and “to be too dependent on good intentions of future 
presidents”. If the US were to withdraw, Kemp considers it unlikely that China would agree 
on a deal without participation of the US. The participation of US and China can be 
considered important as in 2013 they covered for 43 % of the global CO2 emissions (figure 
14). 
 
4.3. The INDCs of BASIC countries and the US 
The INDC documents of Brazil, South Africa, India, China and the US are very different in 
their structure, length and topics. This makes comparing the ambition of their contributions 
more difficult. Though the direct targets are not in direct interest of this research, table 1 
summarizes the main targets from the contribution to increase the contextual knowledge. 
For example, the US and Brazil have promised to reduce their emissions by certain amount of 
percentages below 2005 level by 2025, South Africa has developed a peak, plateau and 
decline (PPD) -process in order to peak its emissions by 2025-2030, and India and China 
present their reductions as emission intensity of their GDP by 2030 from 2005 level. In 
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addition to these quantitative reductions targets, the BASIC countries have mentioned other 
qualitative targets like building capacity and mobilizing funds.  
 
Table 1. A Summary of the INDC Documents. The main targets in the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions by Brazil, China, India, South Africa and the US. (UNFCCC 2016) 
COUNTRY TARGET 
Brazil  To reduce GHG emissions by 37 % below 2005 levels in 2025 
 To reduce GHG emissions by 43 % below 2005 levels in 2030 
China  To peak its emissions by 2030 and do its best to peak early 
 To lower CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 60 % to 65 %  
from the 2005 level 
 To increase the non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption 
 around 20% 
 To increase the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic 
 meters on the 2005 level 
India  To reduce the emission intensity of its GDP by 20-25 % by 2020 
 from 2005 level 
 To reduce the emission intensity of its GDP by 33 to 35 % by 2030 
 from 2005 level 
 To achieve about 40 % cumulative electric power installed capacity  
from non-fossil fuel based energy resources by 2030 
 To create an additional carbon sink of 2.5 to 3 billion tons of CO2 
 equivalent by 2030 
South Africa  Peak, plateau and decline (PPD) model to describe their future emission 
development starting from 2020 
 PPD forecasts the emissions to peak by 2025 and 2030 
The US  To reduce GHG emissions by 26-28 % below its 2005 level and to  
make the best effort to reduce them by 28 % 
 
There are also differences on how the contributions discuss climate change and the process of 
reaching the reduction goals. The INDCs of the US and India are clearly positioned furthest 
from each other. The INDC of the US is rather simple only setting the quantitative goal, 
justifications for the goal and means for the implementation without further discussing 
developing countries or financial support. The INDC of India discusses deeply the 
phenomenon of climate change, Indian relationship with nature, and the inequality between 
developing and developed countries.  
 
All BASIC countries name themselves as developing countries and mention the CBDRC 
principle in their INDC documents. South Africa is the only one who does not mention 
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developed countries as the ones responsible for climate change but speaks about “those who 
have accumulated on emissions”. The argumentation for developed countries’ responsibility is 
strongest in China’s and India’s documents. For example India is highlighting that their goals 
are voluntary-based and some of their goals are bending on the actions of developed 
countries. In addition, in the end of India’s document they “reserve the right to make 
additional submissions on Intended Nationally Determined Contribution as and when 
required.” 
 
South Africa and Brazil can be argued to be most transparent in their INDC documents since 
for example South Africa has calculated how their emissions will be in the future and how 
much they have already invested in climate change. This builds up the credibility of their 
climate funding requests. Brazil has also calculated how much their reductions would be in 
terms of emission intensity of their GDP which permits the comparison with India and China. 
 
5. Methodology 
Chapter five is divided into five parts covering the methodology, methods and description of 
the analysis process and the data. Identities were proved earlier to be social constructions 
which is why social constructionism will be shortly discussed next. 
5.1. Social Constructionism 
Social constructionism is a broad approach to define under one feature but Burr (2000) has 
tried to highlight four typical characters. Firstly, social constructionism questions the taken-
for-granted knowledge about the world and ourselves and attempts to make a meaning of the 
world from a critical viewpoint. Secondly, the human understanding of the world is not only 
specific to a particular historical and cultural context but in addition, product of that culture 
and history. Thirdly, connected to the second feature, truth is defined as the current ways of 
understanding the world. This makes also the theories and explanations dependent on the 
given time and culture, a reason why the discussion should never be disconnected from the 
context (Luostarinen & Väliverronen 2007). Thus, there exists a number of understandings of 
the world and according to Burr’s fourth belief, some actions are preserved because they are 
appropriate for the current understanding of the world. According to social constructionism, 
there are no pre-given, determined nature to the world but people construct their own versions 
of reality between them. Social constructionism aims at finding explanations from the 
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processes, of how the structures are created in dynamic processes, not solely of the static 
social structures. (Burr 2000)  
 
Eskola and Suoranta (2001) defines language as a product of social reality while it is 
simultaneously producing the reality. This is why, language can be used in multiple ways in 
effort of reaching different goals. Thus, texts can be viewed to be structured as how they have 
been made to serve a specific purpose (ibid.). This highlights the importance of context in 
discourse analysis. Poststructuralist view of language sees it as “a site of variability, 
disagreement and potential conflict” (Burr 2000: 41) instead of being an agreed, fixed system 
of signs. This idea makes language a temporary phenomenon, which can be challenged and 
reproduced. This point is closely linked to Feindt and Oels’ (2005) earlier mentioned opinion 
of how climate change has various confronting interpretations.  
 
Burr (2000) argues that the poststructuralist view of language offers important opportunities 
for understanding a person’s identity: if identities are built in language, then language is also 
the place where they can be challenged or changed. This is relevant for this research, since the 
hypothesis is that China’s developing country identity would have changed and it would be 
visible in the documents through language.  
5.2. Discourse in Geopolitics 
Discourse analysis has been one of the most popular methods to research the construction of 
geopolitical identities (Müller 2010). Ó Tuathail (1998a: 1) explains geopolitics to be a 
“discourse about world politics, with a particular emphasis on state competition and the 
geographical dimensions of power”. Geopolitics aims at making the world politics meaningful 
and in the context of discourse analysis this means understanding the labels and images being 
used in world politics (Ó Tuathail 1998a). Particularly understanding because discourses 
cannot be claimed as true or false in a comparison to the reality. They can only be discussed 
relative to each other. Thus, instead of one truth, one needs to accept the variety of alternative 
discourses (Burr 2000). Before discussing discourse analysis further, a few words will be said 
about the definition of discourse. 
 
Foucault (1972: 49) offers one definition to the broad concept of discourse as “practices 
which form the objects of which they speak”. Burr (2000: 48) explains discourse from a 
poststructuralist perspective as “a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, 
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statements and stories that some way produce a particular version of events”. Burr’s idea can 
be considered relevant for this research, as she states these approaches to have been useful for 
researching identity and change. Also Müller (2008) positions critical geopolitics to originally 
being built on the paradigmatic shift towards poststructuralism.  
 
A later trend in critical geopolitics has been to use a broader definition of discourse including 
social practice. This has provided a more thorough contextual understanding of geopolitical 
identities (Müller 2008, 2010). Some identities are more resilient than others as the decision 
of which discourses are credited the label of “truth” is in the interest of relatively powerful 
groups. Discourses can be used to justify one’s own actions. Justification has an important 
role in the world of discourses, especially the dominant discourse is constantly challenged by 
the alternative ones and forces it to confirm its truthfulness continuously. This is relevant as 
the developing country identity can be considered to be a justification for a certain type of 
climate actions. The important role of language in the identity construction explains why 
China’s geopolitical identity is analyzed through discourses in this research.  
 
5.3. Critical Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis cannot be considered as a method but as a set of interdisciplinary 
approaches trying to deconstruct the data. The aim of the deconstruction process is to 
understand the text as constructions which are creating a certain type of images of the 
particular people and actions (Eskola & Suoranta 2001). In the climate negotiation context, 
this can be explained as environmental discourses shaping identities, expectations and 
responsibilities which are on a larger level, constructing the world (Feindt & Oels 2005). 
Norman Fairclough can be considered as one of the founders of critical discourse analysis 
(CDA). Fairclough (2010) argues CDA to be normative because the critical aspect broadens 
the analysis to consider questions of what is wrong in a society, institution or organization and 
how could it be improved. This however, brings the debate into critical discourse analysis 
since many people have different kind of ideas what actually can be considered as an 
improvement. According to Feindt and Oels (2005), discourse analysis has influenced the way 
environment is defined in environmental politics, transforming the environment to be 
discursively constructed instead of being positioned to be outside the society.  
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The young tradition of geopolitical discourse analysis has been criticized (Atkinson & Dodds 
2000) mainly for two reasons. Firstly, it is impossible task to highlight a specific discourse 
objectively, as geopolitics can never be truly neutral (Ó Tuathail 1998a). Ó Tuathail suggests 
the solution to be awareness of the cultural embeddedness. It is more fruitful to effort to 
critically understand the process rather than recognize individual discourse. The second critic 
focuses on the increasing dissatisfaction towards the lack of transparency in the 
methodologies of geopolitical research (Müller 2008, 2010). Though, Müller admits that the 
utility of discourse analysis is partly in its flexibility to be structured to fit the research 
objectives. To answer this criticism, the analysis of this research will be presented in detail in 
the chapter 5.4. to increase the methodological transparency.  
 
Since CDA tries to offer normative solutions it cannot offer them from the already existing 
practices, Fairclough (1992) considers it as a form of social constructionism. This is why the 
analysis needs to be considered as a production of a given social and cultural context (Huckin 
1997). Basically, this means that the analysis of this research needs to be understood as a 
suggestion of Master thesis by a female western Development Geography student, written 
after the COP21 and just before the Paris Agreement steps into force in November 2016.    
 
Fairclough’s framework (figure 15) suggests that discourses and discourse analysis have three 
dimensions which offers three optional ways of reading the complex social event (Fairclough 
1992). First dimension of discourse is the spoken or written text, second is the discourse 
practice which includes the production and interpretation of the text and third is the text as 
socio-cultural practice. Based on the first dimension of discourse analysis, the data can be 
described and analyzed with text analysis tools (Fairclough 2010). The second dimension 
attempts to interpret the text as a construction of a specific process, in other words as 
discourse practice. The third dimension tries to position the text into the sociocultural context 
and effort to give an explanation of the text within its context. In this research, this analysis is 
conducted with the help of Thomas Huckin’s critical discourse analysis frame (1997) which is 
based on these Fairclough’s (1992) three dimensions.  
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Figure 15. Fairclough’s Framework of Discursive Events. Fairclough suggests that there are three optional 
ways of reading social events which makes the dimensions of discourse and discourse analysis more complex. 
Fairclough has presented this frame originally already in 1992 but this modified version is from 2010. 
(Fairclough 2010: 133) 
 
5.3.1. Critical Discourse Analysis Frame 
The purpose in CDA is not to do a comprehensive linguistic analysis nor is it possible to find 
one standardized frame for the analysis. Huckin’s critical discourse analysis frame (1997) 
offers one potential strategy (table 2). Huckin’s frame is chosen because of its easy usability 
and practicality to understand the document texts in their context. In addition, its table format 
proved the comparison between the frames pragmatic. 
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Table 2. The Critical Discourse Analysis Frame. The CDA table was used in the textual analysis  
(Huckins 1997)  
1. TEXT LEVEL Document was analyzed as a whole, attempting to understand general 
view. 
Genre Genre sets certain limits or principles which the text usually follows. 
Manipulation is possible by for example stretching those limits or leaving 
out something expected from the genre on purpose.  
Framing Text is analyzed by interpreting the context in which it is written and how 
the matter is presented from the writer’s perspective.  
Foregrounding  
Backgrounding 
Omission 
Foregrounding and backgrounding are writer’s choices to underline and 
highlight specific issues on the expense of others. They might occur 
thematically or for example in the text structure. Omission is the most 
manipulative form of backgrounding meaning fully excluding something 
important from the text.  
Presupposition Presuppositions are ideas represented as truths without any alternatives. 
These ideas can be taken for granted without knowing how to question 
them.   
Discursive differences Text can include various styles of discourses that might even conflict with 
each other’s.  
2. SENTENCE LEVEL The sentences were analyzed one by one. 
Topicalization Topicalizing is foregrounding at sentence level: the topic positions will 
get reader’s attention.  
Agent-patient The agent-patient relations are captured by the question who is doing 
what to whom? Leaving the actor out of the sentence structure leads the 
attention to the action.  
Presupposition Presupposition exists at sentence level, too, when for example facts are 
presented without references or comparisons.  
Insinuations Insinuations are phrases with ambiguous double meanings. They can be 
used cleverly, suggesting something but always having the possibility to 
pretend to have been meant for the other meaning.  
3. WORD LEVEL Words were analyzed based on their connotations, register and modality. 
Connotations Words might have positive or negative connotations in a specific cultural 
context.  
Labels  Labels are connotations of different sides which are difficult to describe 
neutrally.  
Register Register can be evaluated by the degree of formality of the texts. A sense 
of formality/informality is formed with textual choices, subject and 
technicality.  
Modality Modality depends on how certain tone statements are presented which 
impacts how reader will conceive the authority of the writer.  
 
  
Huckin’s frame first level focuses on the text as a whole. This level is connected on the text 
analysis phase of the Fairclough’s framework (figure 15). In this research this level was used 
to describe the genre and to improve the understanding of how the climate co-operation is 
discussed in the BASIC and US-China frames. This included recognizing on the other hand 
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the topics that appeared frequently or seemed to be highlighted, and on the other hand, the 
topics that were in omission.  
 
The second and third level of the frame tries to deepen the understanding by reading the texts 
more carefully, first by sentence level and then going into word level. It continues the text 
analysis of Fairclough’s frame but attempts to also consider the text as a discursive practice 
(Fairclough’s second dimension). This interpretation process thus continues to mirror the text 
to its context. Like Eskola and Suoranta (2001) mentioned the effort is to deconstruct the text. 
Textual choices and the production of a text can be thought as part of creating the text. The 
second level studies the sentence structures, agents and the framing within the sentences. The 
third level emphasizes particular terms and phrases which might have special meanings within 
a particular cultural context. This level includes recognizing how for example different actors 
are labelled, modality and evaluate the level of formal register within the text.  
 
Huckin’s CDA on text, sentence and word level focuses on doing text analysis and 
interpreting the text as a discourse practice. The next step in Huckin’s table is the contextual 
interpretation which is closely linked to Fairclough’s dimensions of researching the data as a 
discursive and socio-cultural practice. Next, the analysis process of this research is explained 
by discussing how the results were applied.  
 
5.4. Applying the Results 
Figure 16 represents the analysis process of this research. After analyzing the data with 
Huckin’s Critical Discourse Analysis frame, the main results were formed under the two 
questions who is China and where is China? These were borrowed from the geopolitical 
identity research by David Newman (2000) mentioned earlier. The main themes and topics 
were chosen based on the textual and interpretation analysis of the CDA table. The themes 
were chosen based on the frequency and dominance in the documents. However, the main 
focus was in the discourses trying to observe how these themes were discussed, constructed 
and presented in the two frames. These results will be discussed under the who is China -
question. At this point, the findings are discussed separately for the BASIC and US-China 
frames.  
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After this, the where is China? -question was endeavored to be answered applying Newman’s 
analysis to view the research object in relation to other places. Thus, all places, coalitions, 
organizations and actors were listed from all documents and the ones mentioned five or more 
than five times were taken a closer look.  
 
Figure 16. The Analysis Process of This Research.  The analysis is divided into four parts. The contextual 
interpretation of the results is continued in the discussion. 
 
After these results, the research focused on the contextual interpretation of the genre and the 
two frames. The contextual interpretation was deepened in the discussion chapter as the 
results were applied to the evaluation of climate discourse-practice regimes presented earlier. 
The next phase included the interpretation of climate change framings in the data with the 
help of security threat table (Harle & Moisio 2000). One of the objectives in this research was 
to try to understand the worldview of the two frames. Based on the results of the geopolitical 
imagination within the frames, a suggestion of geopolitical mapping is presented as an 
outcome of the research.  
 
5.5. Description of Data 
Research data consists of seven news releases published on the webpage of People’s Republic 
of China National Development and Reform Commission. NDRC publishes two kind of 
documents on their webpage, news releases and policy releases but only the news releases can 
be considered relevant for this research because of their climate-related topics. The included 
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documents can be viewed from table 3. The releases are published in 2012-2016. They are 
Joint Statements or Presidential Statements of the BASIC Ministerial Meetings on Climate 
Change or China-US bilateral meetings on climate change. There are three documents 
connected to BASIC countries and four connected to United States. All the documents are 
under ten pages and they are all published relatively quickly after the meeting itself. This 
research is interested especially in the era after Copenhagen climate meeting thus the data was 
limited to cover time period after the Copenhagen meeting in 2009 all the way to this day.  
 
Table 3. Description of the Data. Data references are found in the end of the research. 
 
 
REFERRED 
NUMBER 
 
PUBLISHING 
TIME 
EVENT TIME & 
LOCATION 
TITLE PAGES 
1. 17.07.2012 12.-13.07.2012 
Johannesburg 
South Africa 
Joint Statements Issued at the 
Conclusion of the 11st BASIC 
Ministerial Meeting 
on Climate Change 
4 
2. 15.04.2013 No data Joint U.S.-China Statement  
on Climate Change 
3 
3. 18.02.2014 15.02.2014 
Beijing 
China 
U.S.-China Joint Statement  
on Climate Change 
1 
4. 26.09.2015 25.09.2015 
Washington D.C. 
United States 
China-U.S. Joint Presidential 
Statement on Climate Change 
6 
5. 09.11.2015 31.10.2015 
Beijing 
China 
Joint Statement Issued at the 
Conclusion of the 21st BASIC 
Ministerial Meeting 
on Climate Change 
9 
6. 01.04.2016 31.03.2016 
Washington D.C. 
United States 
China-U.S. Joint Presidential 
Statement on Climate Change 
3 
7. 04.07.2016 07.04.2016 
New Delhi 
India 
Joint Statement Issued at the 
Conclusion of the 22nd BASIC 
Ministerial Meeting 
on Climate Change 
3 
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The research questions are interested of China’s geopolitical identity which is always 
explained in relation to other nations as discussed in 3.3. Thus, the data was limited to the 
news releases that were written based on meetings with other BASIC nations and the United 
States. This limitation deleted only three documents of which two were based on strategic and 
economic dialogue meetings (one with India and one with US) and the third deleted document 
was about building Silk Road Economic Belt. These three documents were left out because 
their themes were out of the interest of research questions and were remarkably different 
format from the climate related documents. 
 
These limitations made the data relatively uneven because there were only two BASIC 
countries connected documents and four connected to the United States. In addition, as the 
Paris meeting in 2015 can be considered as one of the most important events in climate 
politics, it felt unequal and insufficient that the data would consist of only one document after 
the meeting. This was document 6 in the US-China frame. What is interesting, is that BASIC 
countries too, had had a meeting on climate change in April 2016 in New Delhi, but it has not 
been published by the NDRC. However, this document was found for example on South 
Africa’s Department of Environmental Affairs (2016) government releases and was included 
to the research data to make it more comprehensive and equal.  
 
6. Results 
Table 4 presents a summary of the results from the CDA conducted with the help of Huckin’s 
table (1997). The documents of the two frames were analyzed on text, sentence and word 
level. This table presents the results from the text analysis, thus it represents only the first part 
of results in the whole CDA process. As this research is mostly interested in the process of 
how identity is being built in the language and not solely on individual discourses, these 
results were not the main outcome and hence, they are just presented only shortly. They were 
used to find the main themes and discourses which will be discussed next. 
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Table 4. A Summary of the Textual Analysis Results. The data was analyzed with the help of Huckin’s CDA 
table and the results were summarized separately for the BASIC and US-China frames. 
 
BASIC FRAME US-CHINA FRAME 
TEXT LEVEL  
Genre  The documents have the same format 
and structure of numbered paragraphs. 
 The documents are formal and 
diplomatic, though they use rhetoric 
means like strong opinions and 
repetition. 
 50 % of the documents are written in 
coherent story format and 50 % are 
structured into numbered paragraphs. 
 The presidential statements (4 and 6) 
are written more formally but all the 
documents are polite and diplomatic. 
They use rhetoric means like building 
up togetherness and superlatives. 
 The purpose of the releases changes 
within time.  
Framing  The BASIC representatives are all 
Ministers of Environment, except China 
has one from NDRC. 
 Climate change is framed as an 
inequality and financial issue. 
 BASIC countries are presented unified 
and speakers for developing countries. 
 Documents cover four years but the 
argumentation remains similar. 
 Climate change is presented as a 
threat that has been inadequately 
answered before, but is possible and 
urgent to be solved.  
 Climate change is seen as a possibility 
for the bilateral cooperation and 
business.  
 The argumentation progresses which 
makes the countries sound effective. 
Foregrounding  
Backgrounding 
Omission 
 The imbalance of actions taken by the 
developed and developing countries 
addressed frequently. 
 Documents are foregrounding the 
dichotomy and CBDRC. 
 Environmental questions or 
vulnerability are not mentioned. 
 The differences among developing and 
BASIC countries are not discussed at 
all. 
 Environmental questions are not 
discussed for other than domestic 
issues. There are no arguments for 
who is responsible of climate change. 
 The importance of cooperation and 
setting an example are highlighted. 
 China and U.S. are presented as the 
major actors in climate negotiations 
while the UN-track is not so visible.  
Presupposition  The dichotomy will remain the same.  
 The negotiations will be based on the 
principles of Kyoto Protocol. 
  Interests of BASIC countries and all 
developing countries are the same. 
 BASIC countries are securing the 
interests of other developing countries.  
 The dialogue between BASIC countries 
will continue and it will be cherished.  
 Their climate actions are ambitious. 
 Working together on climate change 
can serve as a possibility for further 
bilateral cooperation. 
 Full implementation of Paris 
agreement will win the fight against 
climate change. 
Discursive 
differences 
 Documents are presenting the BASIC 
group active and ambitious, though the 
developed countries are constructed 
more powerful as all the action is 
required from them.   
 
 Climate change is posed as a threat 
facing humankind but also as a 
possibility for cooperation and 
business. 
 
SENTENCE LEVEL  
Topicalization  The developed countries’ lack of 
responsibility is topicalized.  
 The cooperation and business 
opportunities are highlighted over the 
environmental climate goal. 
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 The UN-track is highlighted without 
being criticized.  
 The amount of new arguments or 
opinions is limited.  
 
Agent-patient  83% of the sentences have the 
Ministries of the BASIC countries as 
their agent. 
 35% of the sentences urge something 
from the developed countries.  
 Developing nations are often depicted 
as an answer to whom -question.  
 84% of the sentences have the U.S. 
and China as their agent.  
 Sentence structures make the other 
nations sound passive and following 
their actions.  
 Developing countries are mentioned 
only in one document with words like 
help, support and need.  
Presupposition  Equity remains as an unresolved issue. 
 Financial support from developed 
countries will increase.  
 Trust among Parties needs to be 
increased with developed countries’ 
ambitious actions.  
 They expect their cooperation to have 
historical significance.  
 
Insinuations  BASIC group urges actions from other 
Parties as soon as possible, suggesting 
themselves to have been the forerunners 
in some parts of the process.  
 Developing countries and the principle 
of CBDRC are mentioned only once 
but with ambiguous phrases in the 
context of China.  
WORD LEVEL  
Connotations 
Labels 
 The principle of CBDRC is framed 
historically.  
 COP21 in Paris described as a 
milestone in climate cooperation.  
 Paris agreement is linked to Kyoto 
Protocol.  
 Widely used labels developed and 
developing are seen without change and 
presented without any definitions. 
 Togetherness is built by using terms 
like our oceans and shared visions.  
 The language uses strong adjectives 
and superlatives frequently. 
 Developing countries are labelled into 
subgroups. 
 Climate change is described as "the 
pillar of the China- U.S. bilateral 
relationship".  
Register  Documents are similar to the UNFCCC 
documents and include technical details. 
 The subject field is very similar in all 
three documents focusing on 
dichotomy, CBDRC and financial 
questions. 
 Documents are relatively formal and 
easy to read. The level of technicality 
varies between the texts.  
Modality  Authority is questionable because of the 
demands for developed countries. 
 Certitude is relatively high because the 
use of modal verbs is limited and the 
use of modal verbs of obligation like 
must, need and should, are used 
frequently. 
 The modality is different between the 
documents. The certitude increases 
document by document.  
 Practical examples of actions build a 
strong image of authority of the two 
nations.  
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6.1. Discourses of Who Is China 
The main themes and discourses of the CDA table are summarized in table 5. Four main 
themes in the data were climate change, the principle of CBDRC, leadership and Paris 
Agreement. However, these themes were discussed differently in the two frames and will be 
presented next, first under the BASIC frame and then under the US-China frame. The 
discourses within the frames are partly creating the climate geopolitical imagination of the 
given frame and this is why they are explained as who is China –discourses.  
 
Table 5. Themes and Discourses of the Data. These discourses are discussed under the who is China question.  
 
 
THEME 
 
DISCOURSE IN BASIC 
FRAME 
DISCOURSE IN US-CHINA 
FRAME 
Climate Change  Inequality 
 Historical stability 
 Possibility 
 Urgency 
Principle of CBDRC  Development 
differentiation 
Not discussed 
Leadership  Leadership as a 
Responsibility versus 
ambition-leadership 
 Responsible and 
ambitious leaders 
 
Paris Agreement  Paris as a milestone  Success 
 
6.1.1. BASIC Frame 
The main discourses in the BASIC frame were inequality, historical stability, development 
differentiation, leadership as a responsibility versus ambition-leadership and Paris as a 
milestone.  
 
Theme Climate Change: Inequality Discourse 
In BASIC country frame the term “climate change” was mentioned 20 times, out of which 16 
times in the context of negotiation terms like organization or institution names. Climate 
change was mentioned four times in BASIC countries’ and developing countries’ domestic 
actions in tackling climate change. These four times were the only ones where climate change 
was presented as a phenomenon or as a problem that needed fighting against. For example the 
vulnerability of developing countries in the face of climate change was not mentioned 
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directly, though their unequal position was mentioned multiple times. Climate change was not 
directly said not to be an environmental question but no environmental concerns or threats 
were mentioned. This is far from the Conceptual Framework on Climate Change (IPCC 
2014), as inequality discourse was not justified as increased vulnerability, though it could 
have been a strong argument. Perhaps, the vulnerability discourse was not used as the 
emerging nations are not the most vulnerable countries in the developing country group. Thus, 
vulnerability arguments within the BASIC frame could cause critic by other developing 
countries. This could be supported by the fact that BASIC countries use the vulnerability 
discourse within the G-77 frame. 
 
Instead, climate change was strongly discussed from the dichotomy point of view. 35% of the 
sentences in the documents urged the developed countries to do something because of climate 
change. This makes the inequality a strong discourse as it is directly or indirectly argued in 
almost every paragraph. There is a presupposition that equity remains as an unresolved issue, 
which is directly written in document 1 but also used in argumentation like the requirement to 
increase the pre-2020 actions by developed countries in order to build trust among the Parties. 
The inequality discourse is not only present in the arguments concerning the policies but also 
in the imbalance of actions taken by countries. The developing countries are seen to have 
done more than they should have while developed countries should increase their ambition. 
The concrete actions of developing countries are not presented.  
 
As the climate change discussion is almost unambiguously built on the dichotomy, the 
suggestions of the solution to tackle climate change include the same discourse of inequality. 
The claim for financial and technological transfer from the developed countries to developing 
countries is presented in every document while the term vulnerability is not mentioned at all. 
This framing makes climate change solution to require a solution for inequality. As the 
equality is frequently presented through financial claims, it makes the argument sound as if a 
sufficient amount of money would solve climate change.  
 
Theme Climate Change: Historical-Stability Discourse 
The documents lack the urgency talk to solve the climate change before the global average 
temperature increases to a certain level. In addition, the present time seems to be excluded as 
the arguments are built on what has not been done and what needs to be done. If time is 
divided into three stages: history-present-future, the first one is emphasized over the others in 
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the BASIC documents. For example, the dichotomy is justified only as the requirement of 
“developed countries to rise to their historical responsibilities”. The dichotomy relations are 
presented stable like there had not been any changes in the groupings of developed and 
developing countries. The arguments have remained relatively similar in 2012-2016 which 
supports the stability. All the documents contain same kind of arguments about the principle 
of CBDRC, climate funding and technological transfer.  
 
Theme Principle of CBDRC: Development Differentiation Discourse 
The relevance of the CBDRC principle in the argumentation is clearly significant. When 
mentioned, the principle is often mentioned with words “in particular” highlighting its special 
importance, for example there is a similar sentence in document 1 and 5 about how the 
outcome “shall be under the Convention, and in full accordance with all its principles and 
provisions, in particular the principles of equity and common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities”. The differentiation is requested to “be reflected in 
each element of the agreement” (document 5).  
 
The “differentiation” –term of the CBDRC is used as describing the dichotomy between the 
developed and developing countries. This creates an image that the differentiation and 
dichotomy would be synonyms. Therefore, the principle of CBDRC would mean that the 
responsibilities and capabilities ought to be measured based on the differentiation between the 
developed and developing countries. This discourse is supported for example by a clause in 
document 5 arguing that the action “should be built on the existing differentiated 
arrangements under the Convention, while providing the flexibility for developing countries”. 
Discourses of inequality and development differentiation support each other’s, building the 
power of these discourses to rise clearly from the texts. 
 
Theme Leadership: Leadership as a Responsibility versus Ambition-leadership 
These three earlier mentioned discourses of inequality, historical stability and differentiation 
combined builds a broader discourse of developed countries’ responsibility for leadership 
which is argued throughout the documents. The climate change solution is to a certain extent 
outsourced as the BASIC countries are not responsible of the problem. Developed countries 
are expected to take or continue to take the lead. The problem cannot be said to truly be 
outsourced, as the developing countries are argued to need the support. This indirectly reveals 
that climate change poses a certain threat to them. However, climate change framing creates 
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an image that climate change would not be a similar problem for developed and developing 
countries. Hence, it is not a global shared problem that requires a global answer but a problem 
that requires a developed country answer. 
 
Nonetheless, in the documents leadership is created not only through responsibility but also 
through ambition. Though, developed countries are encouraged to lead because of their 
responsibility, the BASIC countries are arguing for their and developing countries’ ambition-
leadership. For example, in document one a special thanks is given to developing countries to 
“have presented actions which express significant ambition to reduce emissions”. This 
particular comparison between the BASIC countries’ or developing countries’ high ambition 
and the lack of ambition by the developed countries is mentioned at least once in every 
document. For instance, in document 5, there is a presupposition that developed countries 
have not submitted their INDC documents and as BASIC countries already have, they are 
urging the developed countries to do so as soon as possible. In document 7 there is a similar 
kind of presupposition that BASIC countries will be approving the Paris Agreement as soon 
as possible urging other countries to do so as well.  
 
Theme Paris Agreement: Paris as a Milestone -Discourse 
The BASIC countries’ support for the second commitment period of Kyoto Protocol is 
mentioned in every document. The spirit before COP21 in 2015 can be summarized to the 
strong presuppositions of document 1 and document 5 which are both based on meetings prior 
the actual conference. In document one there is already requirements for the outcome’s format 
and in document 5, somewhat consensus that there will be a Paris Agreement. In document 7, 
Paris Agreement is thanked especially for the comprehensive, balance and ambitious nature 
and its position under the Convention principles including the principle of CBDRC. The 
COP21 is defined as “a milestone in the global climate cooperation”. Though, in 2016 the 
COP21 is described as a breakthrough, the arguments remain similar requesting for more 
ambition from developed countries and increasing the climate funding.  
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6.1.2. The US-China Frame 
The main discourses in the US-China frame were possibility, urgency, responsible and 
ambitious leaders and success.  
 
Theme Climate Change: Possibility Discourse 
Climate change is framed as a challenge that has been inadequately answered before but is 
possible to be solved with “a more focused and urgent initiative”. Document 2 discusses 
climate change like US and China have only then come to know of it because the latest 
research (in 2013) has shown the consensus about climate change consequences. Though 
climate change is constructed as a threat, the frame includes a number of references for it to 
additionally be a possibility. For example it is stated that the two countries “share a common 
interest in developing cleaner technologies that promote economic prosperity and job creation 
while reducing greenhouse gas emissions” (document 2). This sentence structure makes the 
reduction in emissions sound like a by-product not the main goal. Economic and business 
opportunities push through from the texts. Climate change is viewed to eventually transform 
them into green and low-carbon economies. Economy and low-carbon terms are used together 
in 75 % of the documents, as a term of low-carbon economy.  
 
In addition to economic possibilities, climate change is seen beneficial for the bilateral 
cooperation. Climate change is described as "the pillar of the China- US bilateral relationship" 
in almost every document. In addition, the join efforts are described as "enduring legacy of 
the partnership between our two countries" in document 6.  
 
Climate change is thus, linked to many domestic sectors like economic, business, foreign 
policy but it is also connected to domestic environmental problems like air pollution. For 
example in document 3, climate change and air pollution are named as twin challenge that 
needs urgently to be answered. This further emphasizes the possibility discourse as it shows 
the potential to solve two problems. This also tells something about the pressure or motives 
behind the US-China cooperation, as for example air pollution is considered as a severe 
challenge on national level in both countries.  
 
Environment is mentioned in document 2 when describing the consequences of climate 
change. However, after this, their fight against climate change is said to be important “to set 
the kind of powerful example that can inspire the world”. Therefore, though they mention 
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environmental consequences, the arguments place the true concern to be located elsewhere 
than in global environment concern. There are a number of positive outcomes that could be 
achieved while trying to stop climate change which makes it sound beneficial for the US and 
China.  
 
Theme Climate Change: Urgency Discourse 
If time was divided into history, present and future, the US-China frame emphasizes the 
future. Every document presents targets for the future. However, even more than future, the 
argumentation is built on urgency in tackling climate change. The process is clearly visible 
from document 2 to document 6: first in document 2 they address the challenge, in document 
3 they address how to solve it, in 4 what they have already accomplished on national level and 
what are their INDC targets and in 6 they reflect the future. Based on the documents it seems 
that there was an “environmental awakening” in 2013 that caused an understanding that 
climate change needs to answered now which then caused a relatively rapid acceleration in 
their bilateral cooperation. This urgency is visible in documents 2 and 3 with words like 
“hurry”, “immediately”, “a faster track”, and “more critical than ever”. The urgency discourse 
decreases in documents 4 and 6. 
 
Theme principle of CBDRC: Not Discussed 
The principle of CBDRC is mentioned only once in document 4. However, though not 
directly used, it is important to pinpoint how the dichotomy and differentiation are discussed 
in the document 4. For example flexibility should be provided "to those developing countries 
that need it in light of their capacities" and "they urge continued support by developed 
countries to developing countries and encourage such support by other countries willing to do 
so". These phrases can be considered ambiguous in a sense as they blur the black and white 
line between developed and developing countries. This framing builds an image of those 
developing countries who need the help, giving a new definition to the group of developing 
countries. Needing help cannot unequivocally be considered as a permanent state of a country. 
This could then also suggest that the group of developing countries needing help might vary 
within time and context. At least, this definition does not promote a stable dichotomy and 
emphasizes rather the respective national circumstances. Therefore, there is a promise of 
climate assistance but the definition to whom the help should be given is more careful. 
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Theme Leadership: Responsible and Ambitious Leaders -Discourse 
The US and China admits their responsibility in climate change in the documents reflecting it 
to their national circumstances. Their cooperation is often described with phrases like 
“another significant step in their joint climate efforts” and “a historic China-US Joint 
Announcement on Climate Change”. Their actions sound decisive as they are written with 
verbs like “will be finalized”.  The responsibility is built also through the progression over 
time, the cooperation is clearly broadening from 2013 to 2016. This makes the two countries 
sound effective, decisive and ambitious.  
 
The feeling of their responsibility is increased by the fact that no source or reasons for climate 
change are mentioned. Climate change is discussed like a natural phenomenon the humankind 
is facing. This makes their responsibility not directly bound on their emissions. Climate 
change is talked on global, national and local levels which creates it to be a comprehensive 
phenomenon needed to be answered on all levels. Furthermore, the language in the documents 
builds this further because it promotes shared visions, togetherness and we-attitude especially 
among the US and China but also on a global level. For example, they talk about our oceans 
instead of oceans and working together and along with all Parties for a common vision. This 
all also suggests that the US and China has got a shared vision of climate change.  
 
Discussing the climate change as a shared problem increases the responsibility of US and 
China as they are in a way working for a common cause which is beneficial for all. Their 
actions are also said to be crucial besides to climate change but also to inspire the rest of the 
world. This constructs an image that their actions are not only responsible but also ambitious 
on global level. This discourse strengthens especially in document 6: “With their joint 
announcement of ambitious climate actions in November 2014, President Xi Jinping and 
President Barack Obama sought to lead by example, and by the time the Paris conference 
opened a year later, some 186 countries had put forward their own climate actions. This 
sentence structure makes the US and China sound like forerunners. They also call on others to 
follow their actions like to sign the Paris Agreement as soon as possible. The encouragement 
of the other Parties contains also a slight suggestion that the other countries should be doing 
more.  
 
These points create an image of US-China leadership in both aspects, in responsibility and in 
ambition. They are described to do significant climate efforts which makes them sound like 
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they would be doing more than enough. In reality, the targets are presented with different 
indicators which makes their true ambition difficult to understand.  
 
Theme Paris Agreement: Success Discourse 
The relevance of the year 2015 is visible in the documents already prior to Paris. The outcome 
and agreement are linked with the term successful multiple times prior to COP21. The 
relevance is also clear in arguments like the Presidents emphasize “their personal commitment 
to successful climate agreement in Paris and marking a new era of multilateral climate 
diplomacy” (document 4). These points can be considered as presuppositions that firstly, there 
would be an agreement and secondly, the strong wish for it to be successful. After COP21, the 
Paris Agreement is defined as “historic” and “ambitious”. Their belief that a “full 
implementation of the Paris Agreement could win the fight against the climate threat” is 
stated in document 6.  
 
6.2. Places of Where is China 
Geopolitical imagination and identity are constructed in relation to others. Thus, it is also 
crucial to understand how the other places are discussed especially in relation to oneself. This 
is why, the frequencies of places, institutions and organizations were calculated during the 
CDA. Figure 17 shows that the most frequently mentioned groups were developing countries 
and US-China. Developing countries –term was used 36 times in the data. However, 81 % of 
the cases were in the BASIC frame. The most frequently used place in the US-China frame 
was the countries themselves with 36 times. The US and China are mentioned in the chart also 
separately as the documents included parts where the countries were spoken individually. In 
the BASIC frame the countries themselves were always mentioned as a group. Next these 
places will be discussed within the frame they were used, first in the BASIC and then in the 
US-China frame. The chapter includes only the places, institutions and organizations that 
were mentioned five times or more.  
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Figure 17. Frequency of Different Places, Institutions and Organizations Mentioned in the Data. The 
places mentioned 5 or more times were included to the discussion and will be next explained in relation to the 
frame.   
  
6.2.1. BASIC Frame 
The seven places, institutions and organizations mentioned in the BASIC frame five or more 
times were developing countries (29 times), BASIC countries (25), developed countries (22), 
UNFCCC/Convention (14), UN/Parties (10), Green Climate Fund (6), G-77 & China (6) and 
Annex B –countries (5) (figure 17).  
 
Developing countries 
Developing countries play a major role in the BASIC frame since like proven in the who is 
China -discourses, the argumentation was strongly based on the dichotomy. Developing 
countries (29 times) were discussed more than the BASIC countries themselves (25 times). In 
the documents BASIC countries were included in the group with highlighting phrases like 
“BASIC countries as developing countries” and “BASIC countries and other developing 
countries”. BASIC countries role was defined “to secure the interests of the developing 
countries”. This phrase suggests that the developing countries would have common interests 
in climate negotiations. These interests are not directly explained in the documents. BASIC 
countries are claiming for more ambitious actions from developed countries. Because they are 
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stated to secure the interests of the developing countries, one could assume that the claims 
from developed countries could be considered as “the interests of developing countries”.  
 
Developing countries are presented as the opposite of developed countries and they are 
mentioned in the context of requests from developed countries. This makes them sound like 
passive recipients waiting for actions by developed countries. Developing nations are often 
depicted as an answer to whom -question. Though mentioned multiple times, the labels 
developed and developing are not defined or justified in any way. The lack of justification 
also makes the development invisible because if one does not know how the labels are 
defined, how could one recognize a change in the situation? 
 
BASIC countries 
The BASIC countries are presented unified with shared visions and interests as they are 
without exceptions mentioned as one coalition and no domestic examples are mentioned. 
There is no mention about a motive for the coalition. The coalition is also identified to be part 
of the developing country group G-77 & China. BASIC countries and G-77 & China are 
praised for securing the interests of developing countries after the COP21 (document 7). 
These kind of phrases builds an image of the BASIC countries as representatives and also 
leaders of the developing countries since they have been actively negotiating for the benefit of 
developing countries. The cooperation between BASIC countries is cherished and to be 
strengthened in the future.   
 
BASIC countries are presented as ambitious like proven with the who is China -discourses. 
For example 83% of the sentences have the Ministers of the BASIC countries as their agent. 
On the other hand, their authority in the global context seems relatively high as they set 
demands for the developed countries but on the other hand, their authority is decreased by the 
lack of transparency in their own actions. BASIC countries create a rather powerful picture of 
the developed countries as their actions will determine the outcome of climate change. 
Therefore, though in grammatical sense the BASIC countries are the agents in most sentences, 
in practical sense the developed countries sound like the agents and thus, exert power.  
 
Developed countries 
Like mentioned, the two labels of the dichotomy are not defined. However, in addition to 
developing, also developed countries have a major role in BASIC frame. As BASIC countries 
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are included into the group of developing countries, at the same time they identify themselves 
as opposites for developed countries. The lack of trust towards the developed countries is 
referred couple of times. The actions by developed countries are seen as parallel to the trust as 
adequate support is recognized as essential for “the trust among the Parties”. This also makes 
the relations in the dichotomy dependent on the actions of developed countries.  
 
UNFCCC/Convention 
The statements are based on the Convention principles and the UN-track. The arguments are 
also supported with UNFCCC decisions and protocols. In addition, prior to COP21, the 
possible future agreement is discussed as a continuing the Kyoto Protocol. Later on, Paris 
Agreement is thanked especially for its position under the Convention. Also the frequent use 
of the CBDRC principle increases the role of UNFCCC in the frame. The argumentation is 
closely related to the UN-track without questioning or criticizing it, which leaves the level of 
new arguments and opinions rather limited.  
 
United Nations/Parties 
The Parties are constantly referred with the labels developed and developing. This is why 
there are only few references to the Parties of the UNFCCC. The role of UN is viewed more 
as a forum or a tool than a supranational power. Thus, the nations and coalitions are the 
highest body in climate negotiations. 
 
Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
Based on the BASIC frame who is China –discourses, financial support was seen as an 
important solution for climate change. This makes the Green Climate Fund a relevant 
institution in the BASIC frame. The GCF is mentioned especially in the context of promoting 
public financing which should be distinct from ODA. The position of GCF is in the middle of 
the dichotomy between the developed and developing countries.  
 
G-77 & China 
G-77 & China is mentioned in every document and BASIC countries are said to be committed 
to function under the Group. The role of G-77 & China is referred with terms like “the 
common voice of developing countries in climate negotiations”. The group is seen to be a 
way to strengthen the position of developing countries. There is no mention of the diversity of 
the G-77 & China group but the coalition is presented as unified. The BASIC countries and 
G-77 & China are discussed so closely connected that one could question why the emerging 
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nations wish to be representing as their own coalition. Especially, since no motive is given for 
the BASIC country group. 
 
Annex B 
The use of Annex B -term is a case in point of how the BASIC frame is built on the UN-track. 
The term can be found five times, three times from 2012 and two times from 2016 though it 
can be considered as old-fashioned in the global context of UNFCCC. Using this KP related 
term still in 2016 supports the claim that BASIC countries are framing the Paris Agreement to 
somewhat following the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
6.2.2. US-China Frame 
The seven places, institutions and organizations mentioned in the US-China frame five or 
more times were US-China (36 times), the US (11), China (10), Climate Change Working 
Group (9), United Nations/Parties (7), developing countries (7) and  UNFCCC/Convention (6) 
(figure 17). Figure 17 shows that the developed countries and the GCF were mentioned twice. 
However, these were excluded from the following chapter as they did not fulfil the 
requirement of being mentioned five or more than five times. Though, the frequencies for US-
China, the US, and China were calculated separately they will be discussed together since 
they overlap so much. This means only five places, institutions and organizations will be 
considered in the US-China frame. 
 
Developing countries 
The labels of developed and developing countries are mentioned only in one document 
(number 4) with words like “help”, “support” and “need”. The diversity of developing country 
group is visible as the document mentions particularly least developed countries, small island 
developing states and African countries. The document labels these groups as “the most 
vulnerable countries in face of climate change”. 
 
The support from developed to developing countries is discussed with dubious phrases like 
“developing countries that need support” or the encouragement of other than developed 
countries to also support the developing countries. These phrases give no clear reference in 
which group China is part of. The only phrase where China is discussed in relation to the 
dichotomy is when it is said to announce ”¥20 billion for setting up the China South-South 
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Climate Cooperation Fund to support other developing countries to combat climate change”. 
China is labelled as a developing country but as a fund giver.  
 
US-China 
The US-China cooperation was argued to be beneficial and significant with the who is China 
–discourses. Their bilateral relationship has clearly developed during 2013-2016, and in 2016 
they already talk how climate change has over the past three years become the pillar of their 
bilateral relationship. The importance of cooperation and setting an example are highlighted 
to a level that it questions whether they are in fact superior motives to the climate change 
itself. The cooperation is also constructed significant since they are rarely described 
individually. The balance between the two is relatively equal. Maybe coincidence but always 
when discussed individually, the same amount of sentences is being written about both 
countries.  
 
The US and China are the agents in 84 % of the sentences. The choice of words and sentence 
structures makes the other nations sound passive and following their actions as they are 
encouraging other Parties to do what they have already done. The documents build a strong 
image of US-China authority in climate politics. There are a number of practical examples of 
achieved goals which increases the trust on their future plans.  
 
UNFCCC/Convention 
The Convention is mentioned only twice in its policy dimension but mostly used in the term 
“Parties to the Convention”. The UN-track of negotiations is not clearly visible, for example 
the KP is not mentioned at all and the principle of the CBDRC is referred once. When 
discussing the Paris success, the UNFCCC is not granted but is presented rather as a platform 
where the US and China working together and with others, crafted the outcome.  
 
United Nations/Parties 
The Parties are referred in the context of encouraging them or proving the US and China 
commitment to work with them. Referring to other Parties recognizes the other actors in the 
climate negotiations in otherwise relatively bilateral documents.  
 
Climate Change Working Group (CCWG) 
CCWG is one example of the cooperation development: in document 2 the initiative to 
establish a Climate Change Working Group is presented and the actions of the working group 
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are already explained in document 3. The CCWG is mentioned in every document and its 
work is meant to urgently research how the cooperation can be increased. This working group 
is supporting the invisibility of the UN-track as the US and China wish to for example 
develop their own institution instead of using the ones already existing under the UN.  
 
6.3. Contextualized interpretation 
CDA efforts to deconstruct the text and also discuss it as a discursive practice within its 
context. Thus, one important level of the analysis is the contextualized interpretation. In this 
research, this is partly conducted in the following chapter and continued throughout the 
discussion. Next, the contexts of the genre and the two frames will be discussed.  
6.3.1. The Context of News Release 
As discourse analysis requires interpreting the genre of the text, a little space here is used to 
discuss the genre of the chosen data. The documents in both frames are written in formal 
language including rhetoric means like exaggeration with extreme words and superlatives, 
appealing to other nations, repetition and ambiguous suggestions. What makes a news release 
interesting term, is that if one googles the term, one notices that it is often used as a synonym 
for press release. Press release can be thought to set some boundaries for the text structure. 
For example in a press release, one can often find a phrase “For immediate release” in the 
beginning and to be finished with contact information for further details. However, the data 
published on the NDRC webpage did not fulfil these guidelines. However, the documents in 
the US-China frame were published in the same format from word to word by the White 
House. They were published as press releases and included these press release features. In the 
BASIC frame the publishing place varies. For example in South African Department of 
Environmental Affairs they are published as media releases. By India’s Ministry for 
Environment, they were published as climate change documents. Brazil’s Ministry for 
Environment had not published the documents in English.  
 
It could be argued that this kind of questioning is useless. On the other hand, it does not really 
matter in which format the text is published in which forum. On the other hand, it can be 
considered as one of the most interesting questions in CDA. Which kind of audience is the 
text purposed for? As the documents were titled as joint statements, it implies that they wish 
to state something, not just to summarize their meeting. Since the documents are openly 
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published on the internet, basically anyone can have access to them. However, the texts 
address other nations which makes the target group to be outside of the participating 
countries. This makes the documents as international foreign policy documents related to 
climate change.  
 
From China’s perspective, NDRC represents only one actor in Chinese climate policy and 
these news releases represent only one type of climate related documents. The geopolitical 
discourses are seldom equal in a sense that often for example journals favor certain 
geopolitical discourses to support political agendas (Ó Tuathail 1998a). Thus, the geopolitical 
discourses are influenced by the social structures of power within states in addition to the 
actual classical geopolitical power struggles. Thus, these documents could present only a 
specific geopolitical discourse. This would decrease their significance as data when 
researching the Chinese climate relations.  
 
However, as the NDRC is one of the most powerful climate actor in China, it can be 
considered as “the voice of China” in the climate negotiations. The documents presents only 
one type of climate documents. However, since they are published nearly word by word in the 
same format in different national contexts, they can be argued to represent a rather 
comprehensive picture. By publishing them, these governments are justifying these 
documents to be part of their climate policy as well.  
 
6.3.2. The Contextual Interpretation of the BASIC Frame 
The previous analysis will be next discussed in more detail in the context BASIC countries. 
The contextual interpretation is summarized in figure 18 to consist of four main parts: future, 
leadership, UN-track and developing country identity. The origin of the BASIC group was 
earlier explained to be their similar positions as emerging economies and growing CO2 
emissions. The geopolitical position of the BASIC countries is constantly strengthening, 
especially in climate politics. Their emissions will hardly peak in the near future, despite the 
fact that they are making some careful promises on deductions. Their strength was already 
proven in COP15 where they played a key role in negotiating the Copenhagen Accord but a 
lot has happened since 2009. China’s five year plans have been transforming to a more 
sustainable direction combining the concepts of development and environment in previously 
economy-focused plans. If the relation between environment and development has been 
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changing in the domestic level in China, does it still wish to argue similarly as it did in 
COP15 where it was blamed of uncooperative attitude? 
 
 
 
Figure 18. A Summary of the Discussion within the BASIC Frame.  
 
The INDC documents of BASIC countries were different from each other in topics and 
ambition. The INDC documents also differed from the news releases. All the INDC 
documents emphasized the role of the ones responsible for climate change to take care of their 
duties. All four BASIC nations also promised some reductions in the INDCs even though they 
underlined the nature of the targets to be country-driven. The dichotomy was visible in the 
INDC documents but not as a dominating argument but the content was more comprehensive. 
These ideas of BASIC countries agreeing on deductions remain invisible in the joint 
statements. Though, they could have increased the credibility of the documents as concrete 
actions could have decreased the lack of transparency.  
 
As the increased cooperative attitude of the INDCs and China’s five year plans is not clearly 
seen in the Joint Statements, the argumentation of the BASIC coalition seems weaker. It is 
based strongly on the old black and white dichotomy bringing little new on the UN-track. 
This is supported by the fact that the argumentation in the documents remain relatively similar 
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in 2012-2016, though for example a lot has been happening in China’s climate policy. This 
said, the BASIC countries have not lost their significance and in COP21 in Paris they were 
still negotiating as one coalition. The argumentation is narrow in the documents but it does 
not mean that the geopolitical position of the four countries would have decreased. 
 
China’s bilateral cooperation with the United States prove exactly the point of Hallding et al. 
(2011) that the BASIC countries have opportunities to maximize their diplomatic and 
geopolitical benefits through other relationships. In this context the remark that the latest 
BASIC Ministerial Meeting Joint Statements could not be found on the NDRC web page is 
interesting. It is too early to tell if it was just a coincidence or will the Sino-American 
cooperation decrease the importance of the BASIC frame for China. At least for now, China 
seems to continue to play in both frames.  
 
The BASIC coalition could have potential to increase their power in the climate negotiations; 
the other Parties need them to participate because of their great emissions. Though, they 
continue to address the leadership of developed countries. The developing country position is 
built strongly to their identity. Still, they wish to represent as their own coalition. The pressure 
for BASIC countries to agree on emission deductions is not coming only from the developed 
countries. Also some of the developing countries, especially the ones most vulnerable for 
climate change, think that BASIC countries should decrease their emissions. In that sense, 
these four countries are in a different position than the rest of the G-77 & China. They need to 
justify their identity of still being developing countries. In the documents his justification is 
done in a clear, almost flagrant, manner with terms like “BASIC countries, as developing 
countries, will…”  
 
Partly, at least by their own definition, they identify themselves as developing countries. The 
status brings them benefits which questions motives behind the will of being a developing 
country. For example, in climate politics developing countries can acquire longer time to peak 
their emissions and receive financial aid. It is possible for the BASIC countries to maintain 
their developing status and agree on voluntary targets. This could build an image of 
responsible developing countries. Agreeing on voluntary targets shows that they have 
capacity to do their part in tackling climate change but they wish to decide on themselves. 
Being a developing country in climate negotiations is also a relatively easy way to outsource 
the problem to somewhere else.  
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However, the inequality discourse of BASIC countries did not contain the changes in the 
diversity of the developing countries. The diversity of the field can be argued not to be 
beneficial for the BASIC countries. If the differentiation would diversified, the BASIC 
countries might not get a similar kind of conditions than the rest of the developing countries. 
This can be one reason why for example, least developed countries are not mentioned in the 
BASIC frame at all, though they are included in the Paris outcome (Paris Agreement 2015). 
 
After all, does the developed or developing identity mean so much in the climate negotiations 
in 2010s? BASIC countries are arguing for the dichotomy but to some extent it has lost its 
meaning in being the only determining factor on the emission reduction targets like it was in 
Kyoto Protocol. Paris Agreement is built on the ambition of the country-driven INDC 
documents which have changed the top-down governance into bottom-up approach. The 
principle of CBDRC is considered a key question once again since the INDC’s are expected 
to be drafted according to the national circumstances. The principle can be used to justify 
countries’ contributions. Perhaps, this is why it has also gained a relatively lot of space in the 
BASIC frame documents.  
 
One of the most interesting aspects of the inequality discourse is its two-way nature. The 
BASIC countries are arguing for a more equal world but at the same time highlighting the 
unequal relations. Developing countries are often criticized to be victimized but BASIC 
countries are especially underlining their differentiated role. Naturally, this is done by many 
other developing countries, too. However, often the arguments of other developing countries 
do not remain on justifying their identity but also explain their differentiated role by for 
example climate change vulnerability. This is not the case in the BASIC frame.  
 
6.3.3. The Contextual Interpretation of the US-China Frame 
The contextual interpretation of the US-China frame based on the earlier analysis is 
summarized in figure 19. The key points are cooperation, leadership, urgency and 
contradictions. US-China cooperation is interesting since naturally they have had cooperation 
before but the climate change cooperation is a new phenomenon. It has been developing fast, 
though it started internationally speaking late. Dalby was right in 2016 when he stated that the 
US-China agreement in 2014 was a matter of significance in the contemporary geopolitics. 
Suddenly the two countries with highest emission rates, the other one withdrawing from 
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Kyoto Protocol and the other one strongly declining from any binding targets, were with their 
own words “leading by example”. The international pressure was growing based on their 
previous climate actions and emissions. Instead of slightly changing their climate strategies, 
the US and China went to the other end, not perhaps in the ambition of the targets but at least 
in the scale from being criticized into being praised for. Leading by example in climate 
change has proved to be potential for other Parties’ motivation (Schwerhoff 2016).  
 
 
Figure 19. A Summary of the Discussion within the US-China Frame.  
 
Though, the US-China deal was timed perfectly and precisely. The international community 
wished Paris to be a success and the meeting also had an enormous pressure after the long 
years after Copenhagen. With the deal, China and the US gained a lot of attention prior to 
COP21 and the image from uncooperative countries was at least partly gone in Paris. In the 
data, especially in document 6, the US and China give themselves a relatively lot of credit of 
the Paris Agreement. The urgency discourse in the earlier documents could be argued to be 
due to the hurry to build the Paris success. Considering the US individually, President Obama 
probably also wished the Paris to be a milestone before the US elections. Not only to get a 
certain merit to himself but in addition to get an agreement approved before the elections in 
2016. Like mentioned earlier, the Republican Party has not been supporting the climate 
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actions as much as the Democrats. The outcome of the US Presidential elections will surely 
influence also the China-US cooperation.  
 
There is potential to broaden their cooperation which Atanassova-Cornelis (2012) has 
suggested to be beneficial on the global level, too. The wish to broaden the cooperation was 
stated in the documents, which will probably mean that the climate cooperation will not stop 
to the success in Paris. Especially, since both countries still have a lot of domestic pressures 
like air pollution to solve but also because climate change was framed rather positively as a 
possibility.   
 
What is noteworthy in the documents, is the lack of the UN-track. Though, the documents 
address the other Parties of the Convention, they present their own bilateral climate track. The 
absence of the UN-track does not mean that the US and China would not continue to 
participate in the COP meetings and continuing the dialogue there but cooperating on another 
level as well. It is difficult to estimate how the new phenomenon of a strong bilateral climate 
cooperation will influence the UN negotiations. Especially, if the two countries that could be 
suggested to be the most powerful countries in the world, are dealing their most ambitious 
goals outside the traditional forum. 
 
The US and China could be stated to be the most powerful countries in the world because of 
their economies, emissions and geopolitical position. However, this kind of great power 
identity discourse is not directly used in the documents. They are commenting their position 
with terms like “critical role in tackling climate change” or “encouraging others”. This way, 
their power is built in the documents more carefully, as it would be in saying that “the US and 
China, as great powers…” For example, China is not directly identifying itself as a 
developing country in the US-China frame except for the notion of establishing a fund to help 
other developing countries. Thus, in a sense, Atanassova-Cornelis’ (2012) point of US being 
the key in the process of China’s identity balancing can be questioned.  
 
China and the US were treated equally in the documents though the documents still involved a 
number of conflicting issues. For example, in China’s own INDC document and in its 
National Climate Change Programmes from 2007, China clearly states who is responsible for 
climate change and urges the developed countries to commit to their responsibilities. In the 
US-China documents, the developed countries are mentioned only in one document. Also, 
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China’s domestic documents have been identifying China directly to be a developing country 
with relatively flagrant phrases like “China as the world’s largest developing country”. Yet, in 
the US-China documents this line is rather blurry especially in a comparison to its own earlier 
argumentation. These contradictions increase the awareness that the documents are in fact, 
only compromises about the features which could be agreed on in the meetings. It could be 
argued that both countries are receiving something in the US-China climate cooperation. 
Otherwise it would be difficult to imagine that China would give up its most used negotiation 
strategies this quickly if it did not have other interests in mind.  
   
7. Discussion 
Like mentioned earlier, the geopolitical environmental discourses (GEDS) and geopolitical 
environmental practices (GEPS) are in constant interaction which causes the discourses to 
guide the actions but also the practices to lead in rethinking the discourses. The discourses 
risen from the two frames researched are considered as the geopolitical discourses of climate 
change (in other words defined as the GEDS) and the climate actions the documents of the 
two frames presented are considered as the GEPS.  
 
China’s environmental geopolitical imagination is constructed by drawing a line between self 
and others and is thus also the way how the geopolitical identity is created. Identifying the 
problems and threats in climate change is at the same time creating the geopolitical worldview 
of climate politics. However, as seen in the figure 10, these processes are all linked to each 
other’s and it is impossible to determine where the process begins. As China is negotiating in 
many forums, all these discussions and coalitions have an impact on the China’s geopolitical 
imagination, though in this research only the BASIC frame and the US-China frame are being 
investigated.  
 
The results are discussed with the help of the features in climate change geopolitical frame 
presented in figure 10. First in 7.1. the BASIC and US-China frames are evaluated applying 
the ideas of discourse-practice regimes by Castree (2008). In figure 10, one part in process of 
geopolitical is the identification of problems, dangers and remedies. Climate change framing 
is discussed in 7.2. and the climate geopolitical mapping in 7.3. After this the two questions of 
the analysis process who is China and where is China will be discussed in 7.4 and 7.5. The 
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reliability and validity of the research are considered in 7.6. and the interests for the future 
research in 7.7. 
 
7.1. Evaluation of the Regimes 
The two frames will be evaluated according to the GEDS and GEPS which came to 
prominence in the results. Geopolitical practices to tackle environmental problems can 
include diplomatic, administrative, financial and legal means (Castree 2008). The BASIC 
frame comprised climate practices like organizing the BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate 
Change somewhat regularly and drafting joint statements after the meetings. Though, the 
BASIC countries were argued to have done their respective actions for climate change, the 
only concrete practices mentioned were the submission of the INDC documents and the 
intention to sign the Paris agreement. The US-China frame included practices like publishing 
their joint statements, funding to developing countries through GCF and South-South Climate 
Fund, establishing the CCWG, signing a bilateral agreement and providing detailed 
information about their individual climate action targets.  
 
Castree’s suggestion of the discourse-practice regime characters was presented earlier in 
3.2.1. According to him, the regimes can be divided into declaratory, promotional, 
implementation and enforcement regimes. The US-China and the BASIC country frame can 
both be considered declaratory and promotional as these phases cover the building process of 
a regime. They can both be considered declaratory as they both have expressed the need to 
form a regime: the BASIC countries to secure the interests of developing countries and the 
US-China frame because of the recognition of the inadequate global response until 2013. In 
addition, both frames can be defined as promotional as they have gone past the 
encouragement of building a regime and started regular meetings.  
 
Third character is implementation meaning developing regime’s common environmental 
discourses and practices. The US-China frame have been doing this as well since they have 
for example established the CCWG and drafted a joint agreement. The BASIC countries have 
naturally common climate discourses and practices like urging the developed countries, 
promoting the principle of CBDRC and supporting the interests of other developing countries. 
However, as these are strongly relying on the UN-track and the interests of the G-77 & China, 
it is hard to define whether they are the common discourses and practices of BASIC countries 
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or developing countries. If Castree’s idea is to consider only particular discourses for a 
specific regime then it is questionable whether BASIC frame can be considered as an 
implementation regime.  
 
The US-China frame has established their specific plans, thus they can be considered also as 
an enforcement regime. The BASIC frame practices include only INDC submission and the 
regular meetings. BASIC countries could have the potential to establish more practices but 
based on the results of this research, it cannot be described as an enforcement regime. What 
comes to its status as promotional or implementation regime, one needs to consider also the 
invisible discourses. In strict sense the BASIC countries seem to only rely on the interests of 
developing countries. Nonetheless, in reality their inequality discourse also encapsulates 
justifying the developing country status. If this is, however, the only common argument of the 
frame, the BASIC regime can be considered as a promotional regime with weak 
implementation.  
 
This status of the US-China discourse-practice regime is relatively high, as according to 
Castree, the number of enforcement regimes is far behind of the declaratory, promotional and 
implementation ones. It is important to question why BASIC countries are not fully 
implementation or enforcement regime. According to their argumentation, they do not think it 
is their responsibility to act at least not before the developed countries. In addition, it needs to 
be acknowledged that all nations could be enforcement regimes in a sense that they are all 
doing concrete climate actions under the UNFCCC. However, this suggestion was based 
solely on the practices of the respective frame outlined in the documents. Also, the status of 
enforcement would lose its meaning if it were to be considered as a status for all nations and 
this is why the regime specificity was carefully questioned.   
 
According to Castree (2008), the discourse-practice regimes frame environmental problems 
differently which creates the environmental geopolitical map of the world. This means that 
the climate change framing tells also something about the geopolitical climate map of the 
world. The climate change discourses in the two frames are different, though China is part of 
the both frames. The BASIC country frame GEDS can be summarized under two main 
discourses of inequality and development differentiation. The GEDS of the US-China frame 
can be defined under the discourses of comprehensive possibility, responsible and ambitious 
leadership. Next, the framing of climate change is discussed within the two frames. 
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7.2. Geopolitical Imagination and Security Threats 
As discussed earlier, identity is also produced with security political discourses (Campbell 
1992). Like Harle and Moisio (2000) suggested, environmental threats can nowadays be 
considered to be partly producing identities because of their security threat role. Geopolitical 
threats are defined coming from outside, thus defining boundaries between the self and the 
others. Harle and Moisio argue that security policy reports are an inseparable part of practical 
geopolitics. This is why the two frames will be now discussed with the three dimensions of 
security threats presented earlier. It is possible to analyze security threats based on dimensions 
of problem, threat and credibility (Harle & Moisio 2000). However, as the data revealed that 
climate change can also be constructed as a possibility, a fourth dimension, was added to the 
frame. Table 6 presents the results of the climate change framing within the BASIC and the 
US-China frames. As in this context only one problem was identified to cover all minor 
problems, only climate change is considered as the problem. The threat column focuses on 
how the threat was constructed. The last column of the table attempts to distinguish factors 
that influenced the credibility of the argumentation in the respective frame.  
 
Table 6. Framing of Climate Change as a Security Threat. Climate change framed with the three dimensions 
of threat, possibility and credibility in the two frames. The table is applied from the idea of Harle & Moisio 
(2010: 257). 
 
Problem Frame Threat Possibility Credibility 
Climate 
Change 
BASIC country 
frame 
Threat to the equality 
More equal world Lack of transparency 
 
The position to speak 
for all developing 
countries 
Inadequate developed 
countries' 
response 
Authority in the 
climate negotiations 
to claim actions 
Motives 
US-China frame 
Global shared problem 
Business & job 
creation 
Implementation 
Economic challenge Cooperation 
The position to be 
examples 
Rapid problem 
To tackle 
international, 
national  
and local concerns 
Motives 
Inadequate global 
response 
To show leadership Lack of transparency 
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Climate change can be defined as a problem when discussing international climate politics. 
However, it is how the problem is framed which constructs the geopolitical identity. Like 
mentioned earlier, in the BASIC frame climate change is defined as an inequality question, 
thus inversely as a threat to equality. This threat is built according to Harle and Moisio’s ideas 
of drafting a boundary between the threat and oneself. In this case the outside was the 
developed countries and their inadequate climate response. The goal of BASIC countries’ 
requirements could be considered as a possibility for a more equal world. Though, the threat 
is more built highlighting the inequality problem than as a more positive counterpart of an 
effort towards a more equal world. In the US-China frame climate change is constructed as a 
global shared problem concerning all. Thus, the line of the threat can be identified to go 
between the humankind and climate change. This boundary does not underline the ones 
responsible for climate change in the same way. The difference between the frames is also in 
the time-scale. The US-China frame identifies the threat to need an urgent response but the 
BASIC frame seems not to require fast actions.  
 
Though, climate change is seen as a possibility, it also poses a challenge for the economy. 
This can be recognized in the US-China frame in the need for a transformation into low-
carbon economies. These claims in the US-China frame also emphasizes that the 
transformation needs to be conducted acknowledging the terms of economy. Instead of a 
negative challenge, the US-China frame recognizes climate change more as potential 
possibility for cooperation, business, job creation and as an opportunity to show leadership. 
The threat is constructed to be so large that it requires actions by all including the 
international, national and local levels. This is why the US and China could not even answer 
the concern solely with leadership but with being an example and through cooperation.  
 
What is interesting, is that neither of the frames do not emphasize the climate change as an 
environmental threat. This could be result of the fact that climate change is truly a 
comprehensive challenge requiring discussion also about the other dimensions of 
sustainability. Out of the three sustainability dimensions, both frames focus more on the social 
and economic than on the environmental. It is not said to be a non-environmental question but 
relatively little space is actually given to the phenomenon, consequences and concrete actions. 
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In the BASIC frame, the credibility of the threat is decreased by the lack of transparency since 
no definitions are mentioned for the inequality. In addition, transparency concerning the 
actions can be recognized approximately weak. Also, the US-China frame can be argued to 
suffer from lack of transparency because of the slyly suggestions about the country group 
definitions. China’s position in the text was in some parts difficult to understand. BASIC 
countries position to speak for the whole diversity of developing countries can also be 
questioned as well as the position of the US-China frame as an example after such a short 
history of climate actions. Credibility of the BASIC frame is increased by their growing 
authority to set requirements for their participation. With their increasing geopolitical power, 
their requirements will probably become more and more heard. The US-China frame 
strengthens their credibility through the implementation which builds trust on the future plans.  
 
These different descriptions of the problem affect the idea how the question should be 
answered (Dalby 1998; Feindt & Oels 2005; Castree 2008). According to Castree (2008: 427), 
“there is a geopolitics to how environmental problems are represented”. Thus, framing the 
climate discourses is a geopolitical process of inclusiveness and exclusiveness, as the nations 
include topics suitable for their interests and exclude the ones not on their agenda (Dalby 
2016). 
 
7.3. Geopolitical Climate Imagination 
Geography of development is changing which increases the need for more nuanced maps 
(Sidaway 2011). Also Wallerstein (2010) argues that relativity should be increasingly 
highlighted as the world-system has changed to have multiple geopolitical power centers. The 
emerging nations like China are listed as the new geopolitical centers. The point of relativity 
is interesting when researching geopolitical identity in climate politics. Geopolitical identity 
was said to be defined in relation to others (Newman 2000) and the different environmental 
problem framings to construct the geopolitical map of the world (Castree 2008). These two 
statements will be next discussed together trying to understand the geopolitical climate 
imagination of the two frames. 
 
According to Newman (2000) and Castree’s (2008) claims, the climate change framing 
discussed in previous chapter together with the discourses and practices of the regimes could 
be considered to create a geopolitical climate mappings of the world (figure 10). These mental 
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mappings were conducted in this research based on the discourses, actors and climate change 
framings within the two frames. The effort was to understand the “earth labeling” process 
within the two frames (Ó Tuathail 1998a). This means the process of constructing the space 
within the context of climate change. Do they create a boundary of “us” and “them” and if 
they do, where is the border of this dichotomy? This discussion will be continued later in 7.4. 
However, this idea of earth labeling was applied to understand how the space in climate 
politics is constructed in the BASIC and US-China frames (Ó Tuathail 1998a; Moisio 2015). 
These imaginations captures how the global space is divided in the context of climate change 
which makes them also geopolitical climate worldviews. Next, suggestions of these 
geopolitical climate change imaginations are presented for the BASIC frame in figure 20 and 
for the US-China frame in figure 21.  
 
 
 
Figure 20. Suggestion of a Geopolitical Climate Mental Map within the BASIC frame.  
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As, the argumentation of the BASIC country frame is strongly built on the dichotomy of the 
developed and developing countries, it does not discuss other nations. This creates the world 
to be divided into two regions: developed and developing (figure 20). They discuss the 
developing country group a lot which includes the BASIC countries and the G-77 countries. 
BASIC frame considers these three groups rather unified and does not for example distinguish 
any other subgroupings within the group of developing countries. The worldview is built 
through opposites based on the development stage. This is done without defining what 
development is actually considered to be. These points are interesting since for example 
Sidaway (2011) argues that the use of categories like developing world is constantly changing 
more debatable.  
 
The whole dichotomy is justified with the principles of the Convention. The UNFCCC is 
constructed as the main guiding institution of the climate negotiations. The cooperation is 
highlighted in the group of developing countries but the cooperation between the developed 
and developing countries is seen as support, especially in the form of the GCF. Climate 
change is outsourced to be solved by the group of developed countries. 
 
A similar kind of suggestion for a geopolitical climate change imagination was made based on 
the discourses and actors risen from the US-China frame (figure 21). As climate change was 
constructed to be a shared problem facing humankind, climate change is positioned as the 
general theme. Within the frame, all dialogue is taken place under the phenomenon instead of 
UNFCCC. The US-China are acknowledging the other Parties as a larger audience without 
any dichotomies. However, within this large group of other Parties they recognize also 
separate groupings like for example G-20 countries, developing countries, small island 
developing states, least developed countries and African nations. China-US relationship is 
seen significant and to be critical for the climate negotiations. Thus, they are positioned to be 
in the middle. In the documents, they are described to be examples and leading the way while 
encouraging the others to follow. Therefore, they are positioned a step above the other Parties.  
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Figure 21. Suggestion of a Geopolitical Climate Mental Map within the US-China frame. 
 
The figures 20 and 21 show that the geopolitical climate mental maps of the two frames are 
significantly different. The US-China worldview is more diverse and clearly developed from 
the time of Kyoto Protocol and Annex division. Despite the differences, both frames 
acknowledge the developing countries to be helped financially. The developing countries are 
presented similarly with prepositions like “to whom” and verbs like “support”, “need”. 
Though, the developing group is more diverse in the US-China frame. The differentiation is 
proved to be a truly ambiguous term. The two frames use the principle of CBDRC but like 
Brunnée and Streck (2013) suggested both manage to use it according to their own 
definitions. The climate negotiations are slowly transforming away from a clear dichotomy 
but the principle of CBDRC with its differentiation clause is still included in the Convention. 
As long as the differentiation is not defined more precisely, this same dubious argumentation 
with the help of the principle will probably continue. The transformation of the negotiations 
has not been acknowledged in the Convention as the original version has not been updated or 
clarified.  
 
Thus, one could argue that the worldview of the BASIC countries presents a more traditional 
way of seeing the climate negotiations. Traditionalism is also seen in their stable view of 
development. Their own growing emissions or economic growth have not changed the 
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situation from the 1990s. The US-China frame views development more dependent on the 
national context. The stable and varied views of development can also be seen in the 
difference on how the US-China frame develops during 2013-2016 and the BASIC country 
frame remains relatively the same.  
 
In addition, the frames are similar in a sense that they both consider the developed countries 
to be the ones to take the leadership role in the climate negotiations. Though, there might be 
different motives for this like a wish for the support, a wish to be considered as the leader, a 
wish for climate justice etc. This idea also somewhat leaves China’s position unnoticed as it 
was described as one of active countries in climate politics in 2015 but is not defined to be a 
developed country in neither of the frames. Despite the fact that there is a recognition of the 
developed countries to take the lead, both frames present themselves ambitious and urge other 
nations to follow their actions. The UN-track is more visible in the BASIC frame like seen 
from the geopolitical climate mental maps. Still, both frames emphasize their sovereignty as 
they wish certain decisions to be in their hands, for example the INDC documents to be 
country-driven. Thus, like Brunnée and Streck (2013) suggested the bottom-up approach is 
probably the only way to achieve success in climate negotiations. This could also be why 
Paris Agreement was considered as a success by both frames.  
 
7.4. Who is China? 
The objective of this research was to find answers to China’s geopolitical identity in the 
frames of the US-China and the BASIC countries. This question has been answered partly, 
since China’s geopolitical identity in a specific frame and the general identity of that frame 
surely overlap. They can be considered too blurry to distinguish thoroughly as they are also 
defining each other’s. According to the Fairclough’s (2010) principles, texts should be 
analyzed as constructions made to serve a particular purpose which underlines the 
significance of the context. Thus, as the identities are constructed in dynamic processes (Burr 
2000), the aim of this research cannot only be to recognize China’s own geopolitical identity. 
The objective is to try to understand how the geopolitical identity is constructed in the 
contexts of the US and BASIC country cooperation. However, the effort next is to try to 
understand a bit more what does these frames and their identity mean to China’s own 
geopolitical identity.  
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Fairclough (2010) sees discourses political in nature as they are fixed in power relations and 
connected to how the society is structured. This is why the GEDS and GEPS of the two 
frames can be considered relevant. Trusting Fairclough’s suggestion, they are constructing the 
international climate politics but also revealing something about the power relations in the 
negotiations. As this research is built on critical discourse analysis, the effort is to try to 
understand these power relations, their inequalities and suggest improvements. However, 
Fairclough’s point of this being debatable can be recognized in this research, since the two 
frames would probably think differently about what could be considered as an improvement. 
Since the analysis has until here focused on the first two dimensions of Fairclough’s 
framework of discursive events (figure 15) and only grasped the third, the text as socio-
cultural practice, the aim next is to deepen the understanding of this dimension. 
 
On the behalf of the research it is important to understand both questions, who and where. 
However, the analysis showed that like Atwood (1972: 17) suggested in an unknown place it 
is easier to ask where than who? If the two frames are compared to the domestic documents of 
China, the US-China frame and its discourses correspond better the five year plans. In the five 
year plans, especially in the 13th, China has some ambitious plans for the environment but 
also for the development (Xinhua 2015). In the five year plan it does not need to identify itself 
as a developing country since the document is not defined in a relation to any other region. 
The US-China frame could also be seen to connect better with the UNFCCC process, since 
the dichotomy of developed and developing has been slowly changing. Partly, in the 
negotiations the dichotomy has already been replaced by “ambition of all nations” (Brunnée 
& Streck 2013). In the 13th five year plan, China seems like an individual and determined 
actor, as it is setting own targets for itself and not relying on development measures set from 
outside. Thus, it is in a sense, defining its own development how it views it and how it wishes 
to develop in the future. This ideology, is rather similar to the US-China frame, as they are 
negotiating off the UN-track and setting their own principles for the cooperation.  
 
The BASIC frame, could be argued to overlap more with China’s INDC document because 
the inequality discourse is present in both. Inequality discourse is used to justify that China 
would not be responsible for climate change and thus, it will refuse on binding targets. 
However, there is a contradiction between China’s INDC document and the BASIC frame: in 
the BASIC frame development is not seen as a process but as a label. Within the frame, the 
development of the emerging nations is not visible anywhere in the documents. On the 
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contrary, in the INDC document, China is said to aim for “moderately prosperous society in 
an all-round way by 2020 and to create a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally developed 
and harmonious modern socialist country by 2050”. This ambitious development goal is 
supported by the 13th five year plan (Xinhua 2015). Nonetheless, it is invisible in the BASIC 
frame since their cooperation is strongly built on their developing country status and partly 
also to their roles as victims in the face of climate change.  
 
What is also interesting, is that though China identifies itself as a developing country in the 
INDC document, in the context of the mentioned goal it is defined as a modern socialist 
country. Especially since the word modern can sometimes be considered to correspond with 
the word “developed” in the development field. Thus, China’s view of development is truly 
interesting. According to Atannossava-Cornelis’ (2012) earlier mentioned suggestion, China 
sees development as “basis for all problem” and this can be read from the INDC goal. The 
goal seems to suggest that in 2050 it would be in a level where a certain amount of concerns 
in for example culture and democracy would be achieved. This is supporting the claim that 
China sees development as stages and each stage is appropriate for specific characteristics. 
The development view of stages corresponds to some extent with the Rostow’s growth model 
(Willis 2005). However, from the linguistic sense, the sentence is interesting and also 
paradoxical to a certain extent. If researched from word to word, China is actually equating 
two qualities: to be democratically developed and modern socialist. The first one is often 
associated with the western, developed countries as democracy is described one of their 
“qualities”. The later one shows China’s particularity and proofs that China will perhaps not 
go the road used already. If China’s target truly means the balance between these two, it could 
support Varrell’s (2013) idea that despite China would be defined as a great power, it would 
not automatically mean that it would act like expected from a great power. This would then 
actually correspond with the critique of the Rostow’s model presenting the western path of 
development. China wishes not to follow the western path though it views development at 
stages.  
 
One example of this kind of alternative growth path could be thought to be the positive 
response to climate change mentioned as a target in the CPAACC (2013) and 12th five year 
plan (2011). The target is seen in reality in the INDC document in efforts like multiple wins in 
economic and social development in addition to tackling climate change. In addition, with 
climate actions, China has domestic benefits to be gained like air pollution, energy security 
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and renewable energy business (Kemp 2016). For example, the middle-classing population 
requests for improvements also in environmental conditions like cleaner air. The severe 
domestic problems of air pollution etc. have been constructed as domestic security threats. 
This aspect is an important explanatory factor in China’s climate policy as the domestic issues 
are also creating pressures for China to act. In this respect, environmental geopolitics claim 
was right about the globalization of environmental problems to have caused the line between 
national and international environmental concerns to become more obscure (Castree 2008). 
One could argue that China has taken climate change as a development question, instead of 
only environmental, social or economic one. This partly explains for example NDRC’s role in 
climate politics. Like mentioned earlier, combining the energy policy and development 
strategy has been beneficial for the ambition of the climate policies (Chen 2012).  
 
If the differentiation question of national circumstances is difficult to be defined in the 
international climate negotiations on the UN-level, the same problem can be recognized 
within China itself. China’s national circumstances can also be argued to consist justifications 
of both sides: to be responsible to tackle climate change but also not to be. Despite of its 
economic growth, it has to deal with its domestic inequalities with the rich emission-intensive 
coastal regions and Beijing surroundings and the less developed regions in western China 
(Chen 2012).  
 
The differentiation discourse will be discussed more later on but first a little thought is given 
to the inequality discourse of BASIC frame and the possibility discourse of the US-China 
frame. Like proven earlier, climate change was constructed differently in the two frames but 
from China’s perspective both sides are relevant. They are connected to China’s framing of 
climate change as a development question. The US-China frame presents a more positive 
response to climate change seeing it as “a possibility” which is supported by the five year plan 
goals. The inequality discourse corresponds with China’s interests of flexibility in the peaking 
time, legal nature of the commitments and the image of its uniqueness as a great developing 
country power. These, in fact, could both be then discussed as “development possibilities” 
which gives China space to renegotiate its position. The globalization of environmental 
problems was said to have diminished the integrity of the borders between sovereign states 
and urged nations to assign some of their sovereign rights for global decision-making actors 
(Castree 2008). China can be argued to in a way fight against this as it wishes to make its own 
decisions.  
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The discursive practices need to be underlined in order to understand the social inequalities 
comprehensively (Burr 2000). In addition, Müller (2010) encouraged geopolitical discourse 
analysis to improve the consideration of practices. One cannot investigate China’s practices 
throughout with the data being limited to the documents but already China’s diplomacy to 
negotiate in the two frames, can be seen as a discursive practice. Thus, the negotiations within 
the frames are also constructing the overall structure of the international climate politics. The 
GEDS of a specific regime are compromises. The discourses of climate change are different 
in the two frames but in both frames China has managed to negotiate with GEDS supporting 
its own geopolitical imagination. This can be considered geopolitically powerful of China. 
Especially when the frames represent the countries with greatest emissions from the both 
groups of developed and developing countries. Power can be defined to be the ability to 
influence each other (Marklund 2015). However, based on this data, one cannot say how 
much China has on the other hand compromised and on the other hand succeeded promoting 
its own interests in the meetings. The aspect of power will be discussed further in the next 
chapter.  
 
 
7.5. Where is China? 
Like proven in many occasions, for example in the National Climate Change Programme in 
2007 and in the China-US Climate Agreement in 2014, Eva (2003) was right underlining 
China’s ability to know when to act to avoid the international critic. China will hardly agree 
on legally binding targets set from outside challenging its domestic policies and the authority 
of the Communist Party (Eva 2003; Chen 2012). Though, it surely acknowledges that with its 
continued growth of GHG emissions, the actions only by developed countries will not be 
sufficient to stop the warming below 2℃ (Blaxekjær & Nielsen 2015; Vihma 2015). 
However, legally binding targets are not the only way to build a positive image of oneself in 
climate politics. For example, at the moment China has diplomatic relations with both, 
developed and developing countries, has agreed on voluntary targets and attempts to reach 
zero carbon growth by 2050. Thus, China is getting support from both sides just like Chen 
suggested in 2012.   
 
China has more to gain by not agreeing on binding targets or giving up its developing country 
identity but still setting climate actions for itself. Since now it will be considered in a way 
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more responsible, as it is taking voluntary actions whilst it should not need to. By doing this, 
it is supported by both, developed and developing countries and thus gains more geopolitical 
power in climate politics. This can be considered wise since Nye (2013) argues that in 
contemporary world it is not enough to only attempt to achieve “power over others” but 
power “with” others. This he argues because the 21st century problems are often outside the 
control of the states and require shared leadership (Nye 2008a). Shared leadership can also be 
described as smart power (Nye 2008a, 2008b).  
 
The inclusivity of a nation to a specific group is decided by the international community 
through their geopolitical imagination (Newman 2000) like mentioned earlier. The self-image 
is highly important for the inclusion as Eva (2003) stated that it is the image one wishes to 
export to others. As geopolitical identity is defined in a relation to others (Newman 2000), 
China is negotiating its identity within the frame as a relation to the other members of the 
frame. This supports the idea of identity building process as a “boundary-producing 
phenomenon rather than the outcome of a well-defined state” (Dijkink 2003). According to 
Dijkink, the external events causes the national identity to be rewritten constantly. 
 
The rewriting process include the earth labeling earth labeling process of “us” and “them” (Ó 
Tuathail & Agnew’s 1992) which is often done by foreign policy (Dijkink 2003).  This 
process is clearly seen in the BASIC frame as the “us” is the developing countries and “them” 
is the developed countries. The inside being constructed by “the experience and imagination 
of the foreign” (Ó Tuathail 1994) can be distinguished from this frame because the felt 
inequality from the direction of developed countries can be considered to structure the identity 
of BASIC countries. The US-China frame has at least two options for the earth labeling. On 
the other hand, the “us” could be the US and China and “them” would be the rest of the 
Parties or on the other hand, from the threat perspective “us” could be the humankind and 
“them” would be climate change. The latter would present the idea suggested that the 
traditional enemies are changing to for example environmental hazards (Harle & Moisio 
2000).  
 
Identity building is often a process of also defining what one wishes not to be (Harle & 
Moisio 2000). In the BASIC frame this is clear, as the worldview is based on the opposites of 
developed countries but in the US-China frame there could again be a number of answers. As 
their cooperation could be argued to have prompted to avoid the international critique, one 
  84 
suggestion could be the wish not to be the “bad guy” in climate politics. With active climate 
actions, they can ease the negative image of their great emissions.  
 
However, as mentioned earlier there are no right or permanent answer to a country’s 
geopolitical position. The context of an individual country changes but also the 
comprehensive environment is being under constant change (Agnew 2010). This is why it is 
not relevant to only recognize the “us” and “them” but to also understand it. Otherwise the 
analysis will remain rather weak like Ó Tuathail (1994) suggested. Therefore, China’s 
geopolitical position cannot be located with specific coordinates. Nor can it be identified only 
as a victim in the past, a developing country presently and a great power in the future like 
Atanassova-Cornelis (2012) presented. It is important to understand how the rest of the world 
is dealing with the growth of China (ibid.).  
 
Thus, the discursive practice of China negotiating in the both frames is interesting. Both of the 
frames are, according to their geopolitical imaginations, accepting China to their frame 
though the two frames label the “us” and “them” differently. By being included to both clubs 
so to say, China is actually not labelled to be “them” by a major group of actors in climate 
politics. This in a sense allows China to maintain similar geopolitical identity of being a 
developing country in both of the frames. This though, is hard to recognize as it represents a 
new kind of development which is not previously seen in climate politics.  
 
China is promoting its will to increase the South-South cooperation and funding in the 
developing country group. This will probably increase the will of other developing nations to 
include it to their group since its growth is not similar to developed countries but to a new 
kind of South-South dimension. However, this should not be generalized as the interests of 
the G-77 and developing countries have become more diverse and can no longer be 
considered only as promoting the business-as-usual model (Vihma et al. 2011; Blaxekjær & 
Nielsen 2015). This development could and probably will change the dynamics within the 
developing countries. China has acknowledged this by taking the diversity into account by 
recognizing especially the least developed, small island developing states and African states 
to be supported. This could be in a sense thought to be the group who would oppose China’s 
developing country status the most as they are currently probably the most different from 
China. 
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The INDC documents could be said to differ a lot within the BASIC countries. Nonetheless, 
China shares a similar kind of developing identity with the BASIC countries and a common 
wish to represent themselves, at least today, as opposite of developed countries. This has 
proven as a rather strong feature though the coalition in itself does not wish or has not been 
able to compromise on more comprehensive joint arguments. China’s position can be 
considered interesting from the perspective of developed countries in climate politics. Though 
they are not presenting as one coalition like G-77, China is important for them because of its 
emissions. Developed countries would rather focus “on the capacity and current and future 
contributions to climate change” instead of the idea of North-South dichotomy (Brunnée & 
Streck 2013). This is why China’s inclusion in climate institutions or coalitions is welcomed 
by the developed countries as well.  
 
Though, China is identifying itself as a developing country in both frames, the threat is 
constructed differently in the two frames. This is a clear reference how climate change is truly 
negotiated as a constructed danger rather than as a real threat within these two frames 
(Dijkink 2003). For example, the ones responsible for climate change can be thought to be 
constructed differently in the two frames: the BASIC frame considers only historical 
emissions and the US-China frame acknowledges also current emissions. However, in the 
current situation of the climate negotiation, the different threat discourses do not affect 
China’s inclusion or exclusion as the negotiations have developed to a more bottom-approach 
direction from the top-down processes of the Convention and Kyoto Protocol (Brunnée & 
Streck 2013).  
 
The bottom-approach has enabled the coalitions to exclude the need for a shared vision of 
quantitative emission targets from their agenda like the BASIC countries have done. This 
gives for example the BASIC-frame and the US-China frame more possibilities to represent 
joint statements as they would have had in the era of Kyoto Protocol and the top-down given 
quantitative emission quotas. This has redefined the role of UNFCCC as the possibilities of 
the Parties are greater. This development can be suggested to follow the trend of power 
slowly being redefined from centralized to a more diffused, decentered and networked. A 
worldview of this power definition is closer to the geopolitical climate mental map of the US 
and China than the one of the BASIC frame.  
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7.6. Reliability and Validity of the Research 
This research relies on the critical geopolitical theory which can still be considered relatively 
young fashion, though geopolitical research is traditional in Geography. This research has 
tried to apply critical geopolitics as a discourse, a way of discussing and constructing the 
topic, rather than as a strict theoretical framework. In the academic sense, Harle and Moisio’s 
(2000) point that the “critical” term from the critical geopolitics should be left out in the 
future feels accurate since one of the basic qualities of science is to be critical. Though, a 
young theoretical tradition, it has gained some criticism and this research endeavored to 
acknowledge this critique already before the analysis.  
 
For example, the difference between the geopolitics and critical geopolitics is not the fact that 
critical could be above the classical geopolitics but to be aware of its position of being 
produced within the world politics (Ó Tuathail 1994). According to Ó Tuathail, the awareness 
is also giving possibilities to rethink and reconstruct geopolitics. In this sense, critical 
geopolitics can never be considered truly neutral as for example this research could not be 
conducted in an isolated frame. Though, it could be suggested that the structure of the 
research problem increased the reliability as it was formatted as a comparison. Instead of 
commenting one nation within the world politics, the research objective was to compare two 
frames and their relation.  
 
Geopolitics can also be argued to research a small group of elites (Müller 2010) but as 
explained earlier, the discourses appear from the cultural contexts and thus, are not 
constructed only by the elite. In addition, though the data in this research presented the 
statements based on meetings of a small group of elites, the frames included members from 
different nations. This could make some discourses invisible as only the most powerful 
discourses of the frame will end up to the official joint statement after the compromises. 
 
Additionally this fact reduces the validity of the data used in this research. As Eskola and 
Suoranta (2001) reminds a text is always one perspective to any given topic. The 
compromises disappear as they are not visible in the outcomes. For example, it is very 
difficult to state which matter was supported by who for example in the UN official 
documents like the Paris Agreement. In this research the data focused on the two frames, 
which limits the possibilities to say something comprehensive about China’s geopolitical 
identity. This was attempted to turn into strength by mirroring the documents from the frames 
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to China’s domestic documents like the National Climate Change Programme and INDC 
document to better recognize which opinions were in line with China’s domestic policies. 
However, it would have been interesting to hear the larger conversation behind the 
documents.  
 
The data was valid in a sense that it was published by the China’s most important single 
climate institution the NDRC and also in a similar form by the Ministries of other nations’. 
The data was relevant for the purpose as for example according to Ó Tuathail and Agnew 
(1992) the discourses of political documents reveal something about the worldview and 
understanding of the statecraft. However, given the number of documents published, 
resources for a Master thesis, in addition to the work-intensive method of discourse analysis, 
the historical change could not be tackled comprehensively as the data consisted of only one 
document per year from the two frames in 2012-2016. Furthermore, though the wish was to 
cover the period from the Copenhagen meeting to Paris, the data was available only from 
2012. With greater resources, the data could have been broadened to different kind of 
documents supporting these documents. As for example now the practices within the BASIC 
frame were relatively minor and these would have been interesting to investigate more. 
 
The reliability of the research can be somewhat questioned by the fact that the theory of 
critical geopolitics and the method of discourse analysis can be both criticized not to be 
neutral. In fact, Burr (2000) states that discourse analysis is always subjective. In this sense, 
this analysis needs to be considered as a product of the particular social and cultural context.  
 
Geopolitical discourse analysis is claimed to suffer from lack of transparency (Müller 2008; 
2010). This can be agreed on as the background work for this research was relatively difficult. 
Especially because of the fact that the analysis part was not clearly presented in many of the 
articles and researches. This served somewhat as a challenge and a possibility as the analysis 
of this research was tailor-made combining the discourse-practice regime frame of Castree, 
security threat building by Harle and Moisio and the questions by Newman. In addition, the 
most linguistic part of the discourse analysis was conducted based on the Huckin’s (1997) 
critical discourse analysis frame. This gave flexibility to apply the theories but was 
challenging as the transparency was tried to maintain by presenting all phases of the analysis. 
However, the analysis process can be considered as a set of interdisciplinary approaches like 
Eskola and Suoranta (2001) suggested, instead of trying to deconstruct the data with one 
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method. The validity of the research was increased by setting language as the center of the 
interest because the point was to recognize changes in the geopolitical identity and according 
to Burr (2000) the identities are challenged and changed with language.  
 
The goal to recognize discourses from the two frames truly objectively can be considered as 
impossible since Ó Tuathail (1998a) states that geopolitics can never truly be objective. 
However, this is why the research was not solely interested in the discourses themselves but 
the processes behind the discourses like why the BASIC countries are arguing climate change 
to be an inequality question? This was also crucial in order to avoid the weak results of just 
recognizing the earth label process Ó Tuathail presented. However, as language is not a fixed 
system but constantly reproduced (Eskola & Suoranta 2001) it also makes the identities to be 
constantly rewritten. This decreases the reliability of this research as the identities are always 
negotiated in a relation to something. This is why the research objective was chosen to define 
China’s geopolitical identity in the context of BASIC frame and the US-China frame.  
 
7.7. Future Research Possibilities 
As the environmental problems are being redefined as security issues (Dalby 2016), they 
should be included more when researching the geopolitical order. Though the geopolitical 
identity and China’s developing country identity are researched a lot (for example Agnew 
2010; Dalby 2016), the geopolitical identity in relation to climate change not as much 
especially in context of BASIC frame and the US-China frame. Had there been a chance, it 
would have been interesting to better acknowledge Müller’s (2010) critique of increasingly 
include the practices into the discourse analysis. For example to compare the actual emission 
targets of the China’s domestic documents of National Climate Change Programmes and 
INDC document to the NDRC documents.  
 
However, as the BASIC countries can be considered to strengthen their geopolitical power in 
the climate negotiations their role in the future seems highly interesting. There are a number 
of doubts about the future of the coalition (Hallding et al. 2011) and it will be interesting to 
see whether their cooperation will remain focusing on one concern or broaden deeper. Their 
actions by 2050 will also be crucial if the goal of 2℃ or 1.5℃ is wished to be achieved. Since 
like proven earlier in the research, the actions by developed countries, no matter how 
ambitious, will not be enough for the target (Blaxekjær & Nielsen 2015).  
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In this scenario, it does not matter if the BASIC countries are representing as one coalition or 
separately. Their GHG emissions will still guarantee their important position in the climate 
negotiations. Though the form of their cooperation can be also crucial for the nature of the 
UNFCCC. If all the major climate actors like the BASIC countries and the US would cherish 
the bilateral negotiating mechanisms, it would then surely have an impact on the Convention.  
 
Another interesting concern from the perspective of this coalition is the mechanism of the 
Paris Agreement to progressively add the ambition of the targets. Though, it is still unclear 
how the target ambition is actually measured but the BASIC countries might have 
differentiated opinions about it. This will probably be seen at least on some level in COP22 in 
Marrakech in 2016 when the Parties are further discussing the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement. There will surely be pressure from the international community to define this 
ambition as at the moment there is a gap between the emissions INDC covers and the targets 
of the Paris Agreement (Varelj 2016).  
 
Again, the situation in the US is interesting as the outcome of the elections might reconstruct 
the climate cooperation between China and the US. Especially it could be changed if a 
Republican President were to be elected. Surely, these two frames will maintain their role in 
climate politics after the success of Paris but it will be interesting to see if the motives and 
ambition changes after the COP21. As the both frames seem important for the future of 
climate negotiations, it would also be interesting to broaden the research to for example 
investigate how the other BASIC countries see the Sino-American cooperation.  
 
 
8. Conclusions 
The hypothesis of this research was that China identifies itself geopolitically differently in the 
frames of BASIC and the US. The hypothesis was based on the assumption that on the other 
hand China is arguing to be a developing country and irresponsible for climate change as it 
has not been the cause for historical emissions and on the other hand, to show climate 
leadership for example in the field of renewable energy and with the Sino-American climate 
agreement 2014. The objective was to endeavor how China positions itself in the two frames, 
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recognize the similarities and differences between the frames and discuss why the positions 
are similar or different.  
 
The results were confronting the hypothesis, as China positioned itself as a developing 
country in both frames. However, the developing country identity was negotiated stronger in 
the BASIC frame and less obvious in the US-China frame. The worldview of BASIC 
countries were constructed on the dichotomy, lacked notions on the diversity of the large 
group of developing countries and focused to speak on behalf of all developing countries. 
With the US, China positioned itself as being a developing country but perhaps revealed more 
about its versatile identity. It was no longer arguing or justifying its identity to the 
international community but showing it with practices. The US-China frame tried to set an 
example for the rest of the world in climate politics, even though their actions could not 
necessarily be considered as the most ambitious. Negotiating with the US as a developing 
country, China is in a way creating a new way of being a developing country in the climate 
politics. Being a developing country but showing climate leadership on the global level has 
not occurred before on a scale like this. Thus, like Dalby (2016) suggested the climate 
agreement between these two nations has significance for the contemporary geopolitics. This 
can be argued not only because of the agreement but as a practice of constructing the 
international negotiations. It is interesting that the cooperation between these two countries is 
especially strong in climate change compared to the other sectors.  
 
If the geopolitical identity was not completely different in the two frames, the climate change 
discourses were. BASIC countries saw it as an inequality question that could be answered 
with financial support and technological transfers. The US and China constructed it as a pillar 
for their cooperation and a possibility for domestic problems, broader cooperation and 
business.  
 
What is interesting is that while the BASIC frame was more positioned under the Convention 
and the US-China off the UN-track, it could be argued that at the moment the BASIC 
countries are on their part slowing the negotiation process of the UN-track. This is done by 
claiming similar kind of support for all of the developing countries. Though, they clearly 
negotiate under the UN-track, their geopolitical imagination differs from the development of 
the UNFCCC. Also, the INDC targets differ within the coalition. In the BASIC frame the 
solution for climate change was considered to be produced within the UNFCCC but brought 
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in from outside in the US-China frame. The climate negotiations are slowly abandoning the 
traditional form of dichotomy and introducing more bottom-up defined processes. This was 
not recognized in the geopolitical climate mental map of BASIC countries. However, though 
the US-China frame was further from the UN process their geopolitical view of developing 
countries was more diverse recognizing the least developed nations, the small island 
developing states and the African nations. This development is in line with Agnew’s (2010) 
critique of the modern geopolitical imagination and could thus be considered more post-
modern questioning the “norm” of the traditional way of being a developing country.  
 
These two frames are both present in China’s INDC document but from the quantitative 
targets the US-China frame can be positioned closer to China. Also, the ambition in the US-
China frame corresponded with China’s National Climate Change Programme and five year 
plans better. Development is seen as stages in the China’s INDC document and in the five 
year plans, China efficiently plans the path for the next level in both. The development of 
arguments in the US-China documents can be considered to support these plans. The 
argumentation in the BASIC frame remained rather similar in 2012-2016. Therefore, from 
this perspective, the hypothesis can be said to be partly right as it was negotiating differently 
in the two frames. Because of the number of actors in 21st century climate politics, it is 
unlikely that one discourse or regime will manage to overrule the others (Castree 2008). This 
makes it useless for China to try to argue with only one discourse or within one frame as 
according to post-structuralism one needs to accept the variety of alternative discourses (Burr 
2000). 
 
The discourse-practice regime of BASIC countries can be considered based on the documents 
as one-question coalition whereas they could have potential to broaden their cooperation. The 
US-China frame aims for more comprehensive cooperation, it seemed that they have or want 
to compromise on more questions. The two frames similarly did not construct climate change 
directly as an environmental question. Thus, it seemed that China’s identity in the two frames 
was guided by the discourses to justify its concerns of legally binding targets in the BASIC 
frame and the economic and cooperation possibilities in the other. By being included in both 
frames, China is labeled as “us” by both frames.  
 
The dichotomy of Kyoto Protocol has proven to be surprisingly persistent. Burr (2000) 
explains that some discourses are considered as the “truth” because they are in the interests of 
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relatively powerful groups to justify the possible power inequalities appropriate. Though it 
could be argued that as the dichotomy of development is slowly changing or at least its 
diversity is becoming more acknowledged, a research of developing country identity could be 
considered to be irrelevant. However, these identities are also shaping the negotiations on a 
global level. A good example is that the definition of national circumstances in the 
differentiation process was considered too difficult to be defined. As a consequence, the 
definition was left somewhat unanswered by changing the process more bottom-up. This has 
changed the political grouping within the climate negotiations. A case in point is also the 
construction of Paris Agreement in the two frames: the other one discusses it as a follower of 
Kyoto and the other one as a totally new agreement. This is a good example of how language 
constructs the worldview. The US would have hardly agreed on an agreement which would 
have been discussed as a Kyoto follow up.  
 
The ambition mechanism of the Paris Agreement and the INDC documents still needs to be 
defined because of the gap in ambition between the submitted targets and the agreement 
(Rogelj et al. 2016). As the national contributions are now defined to “reflect nation's highest 
possible ambition” in addition to national circumstances (Paris Agreement 2015), it will be 
interesting to see how this constructs the discourses of ambition. National circumstances has 
not really produced competition in climate change of which country has more capacity. 
However, when the discussion is framed to be the question of ambition, it could be suggested 
that no country wishes its image to be unambitious. This development could be thought to 
support the potentiality of modern geopolitics of power to transform into the direction of 
“postmodern world of images and influence” (Marklund 2015). It could also be argued that 
ambition of the actions, though difficult, but could still be easier than comparing the national 
circumstances.  
 
Climate change negotiations is highly relative as the actions by other Parties have an 
influence on the others. For example, there is a clause in the end of India’s INDC document 
saying “they reserve the right to make additional submissions on Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution as and when required”. This could be considered as a reservation to 
withdraw or change their contributions in case for example the developed countries were not 
proving to take care of their responsibility. Especially because the document builds on the 
trust among developed and developing countries which is created by ambitious actions of 
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developed countries. This relativity is also present in the considerations of what will China do 
if US would to withdraw from the Agreement with the new President (Kemp 2016).  
 
This discussion is interesting because though China is now argued to attract most attention in 
climate politics because of its emissions (Chen 2012), what happens when or if China’s 
emissions will peak? Will the next focus point be India if at that point it has not peaked with 
its emissions or will the target of 2℃ or 1.5℃ guarantee that China will remain in the focus 
for longer than the growth of its emissions? As the geopolitical identities are constantly 
rewritten in relation to other geopolitical climate discourses and practices (Castree 2008; 
Dalby 2016), one cannot effort to find access to real, static truth but to improve the 
understanding of the process. This is why researching the relativity in climate politics will 
remain interesting as climate politics is also a product of climate politics.  
  
  
  94 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen for the inspiring 
suggestions and discussion during the process. Thank you for being so encouraging with my 
topic since the beginning. I wish also thank my other supervisor Dr. Paola Minoia for her 
advice and patience though the process has been long. In addition, I am thankful for Professor 
Sami Moisio for his guidance in my theoretical frame.  
 
I have received fruitful feedback from the other Master and PhD students in Russia’s Energy 
Politics seminar group. I wish also thank Mikael Wide, Saara Paavilainen, Vuokko 
Heikinheimo, Henna Puustinen and my family for their valuable comments and support 
throughout the process.  
 
  
  95 
References 
 
Agnew, J. (2010). Emerging China and Critical Geopolitics: Between World Politics and 
Chinese Particularity. Eurasian Geography and Economics 51: 5, 569-582. 
 
Agnew, J. & S. Corbridge (1995). Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International 
Political Economy. 260pp. Routledge, New York.  
 
Allen, J. (2008). Power. In Agnew, J., Mitchell, K. & G. Toal (ed.): A Companion to Political 
Geography, 95-108. Blackwell Companions to Geography. Blackwell Publishing, 
Oxford. 
 
Atanassova-Cornelis, E. (2012). Chinese Nation Building and Foreign Policy: Japan and the 
US as the Significant 'Others' in National Identity Construction. East Asia: An 
International Quarterly 29: 1, 95-108. 
 
Atkinson, D. & K. Dodds (2000). Introduction. In Dodds, K. & D. Atkinson (ed.): Geopolitical 
Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought, 1-24. Routledge, London. 
 
Atwood, M. (1972). Survival. 287pp. Toronto, Anansi.  
 
Bailey, I. & H. Compston (2012). Feeling the Heat: The Politics of Climate Policy in Rapidly 
Industrializing Countries. 74p. Palgrave MacMillian, New York. 
 
Betsill, M., Dubash, N., Paterson, M., van Asselt H., Vihma, A. & H. Winkler (2015). Building 
Productive Links between the UNFCCC and the Broader Global Climate Governance 
Landscape. Global Environmental Politics 15: 2, 1-10.  
 
Blaxekjær L. & T. Nielsen (2015). Mapping the Narrative Positions of New Political Groups 
under the UNFCCC", Climate Policy 15: 6, 751-766. 
 
Brunnée, J. & C. Streck (2013). The UNFCCC as a Negotiation Forum: Towards Common but 
More Differentiated Responsibilities. Climate Policy 13: 5, 589-607. 
 
Burr, V. (2000). An Introduction to Social Constructionism. 198pp. Routledge, London.  
 
Campbell, D. (1992). Writing Security: US Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. 269pp. 
Manchester University Press, Manchester.  
 
Castree, N. (2008). The Geopolitics of Nature. In Agnew, J., Mitchell, K. & G. Toal (ed.): A 
Companion to Political Geography, 423-439. Blackwell Companions to Geography. 
Blackwell Publishing, Oxford. 
 
  96 
 
CPAACC=China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (2013). Policy Paper, 
The National Development and Reform Commission, The People’s Republic of China. 
12.4.2016. 
<http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201311/P020131108611533042884.pdf> 
 
Chen, G. (2012). China's Climate Policy, China Policy Series. 144pp. Routledge, London. 
 
Convention (1992). Text of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 
English. United Nations. 14.4.2016 
<http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/applica
tion/pdf/conveng.pdf> 
 
COP21 (2015). The official website of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change. 
14.3.2016 <http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/>  
 
Dalby, S. (1998). The Geopolitics of Global Dangers: Introduction to Part Four. In Tuathail, Ó., 
Dalby, S. & P. Paul (ed.): The Geopolitical Reader, 175-187.  Routledge, London. 
 
Dalby, S. (2008). Green Geopolitics. In Agnew, J., Mitchell, K. & G. Toal (ed.): A Companion 
to Political Geography, 440-454. Blackwell Companions to Geography. Blackwell 
Publishing, Oxford. 
 
Dalby, S. (2013). Rethinking geopolitics: Climate security in the Anthropocene. Global Policy 
5(1): 1–9. 
 
Dalby, S. (2016a). Political Geography and Climate Change: Introduction to a Virtual Special 
Issue of Political Geography on Climate Change and Political Geography. Political 
Geography 50, 71-73. 
 
Dalby, S. (2016b). Interpreting Climate Geopolitics: Knowledge, Power, and Security", 
Geopolitics 21: 1, 236-241. 
 
Development Assistance Committee (2016). The websites of DCA. 4.5.2016. 
<http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/joining-the-development-assistance-
committee.htm> 
 
Dijkink, G. (1996). National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain. 188pp. 
Routledge, London.  
 
Dodds, K. & J. Sidaway (1994). Locating Critical Geopolitics. Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 12: 5, 515-524. 
 
  97 
Durand, A. (2012). Common Responsibility: The Failure of Kyoto. Harvard International 
Review 34: 1, 8-9. 
 
Escobar, A. (1995). Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third 
World. 290pp. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
 
Eskola, J. & J. Suoranta (2001). Johdatus laadulliseen tutkimukseen. 5. eds. 266pp. Vastapaino, 
Tampere. 
 
Eva, F. (2003). The Geopolitical Role of China: Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon. Ekistics 70: 
422/423, 341-350.  
 
Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and social change. 259pp. Polity Press, Cambridge. 
 
Fairclough, N. (2010). Critical Discourse Analysis. The Critical Study of Language. 2nd eds. 
591pp. Pearson Education Limited, Harlow. 
 
Feindt, P. & A. Oels (2005). Does Discourse Matter? Discourse Analysis in Environmental 
Policy Making. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 7: 3, 161-173. 
 
Foucault, M. (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge. 218pp. Tavistock, London. 
 
Gomez-Echeverri, L. (2013). The Changing Geopolitics of Climate Change Finance. Climate 
Policy 13: 5, 632-648. 
 
Hallding, K, Olsson, M., Atteridge, A., Vihma A., Carson, M. & M. Román (2011). Together 
Alone: BASIC Countries and the Climate Change Conundrum. 123pp. Nordic Council 
of Ministers, Copenhagen. 
 
Harle, V. & S. Moisio (2000). Missä on Suomi? Kansallisen identiteettipolitiikan historia ja 
geopolitiikka. 304pp. Gummerus kirjapaino, Jyväskylä.  
 
Huckin, T. (1997). Critical Discourse Analysis. In Miller, T. (ed.): Functional Approaches to 
Written Text: Classroom Applications, 78-92. United States Information Agency, 
Washington D.C. 
 
Hurrell, A. (2012). Emerging powers, North-South relations and global climate politics. 
International Affairs 88: 3. 
 
INDC of China (2015). Enhanced actions on climate change: China’ s intended nationally 
determined contributions. Unofficial translation. 13.2.2016. 
<http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx> 
 
  98 
INDC of Brazil (2015). Intended nationally determined contribution towards achieving the 
objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 13.2.2016. 
<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Brazil/1/BRAZIL
%20iNDC%20english%20FINAL.pdf> 
 
INDC of India (2015). India’s intended nationally determined contribution: Working towards 
climate justice. 13.2.2016. 
<http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx> 
 
INDC of South Africa (2015). South Africa’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution. 
13.2.2016. 
<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/South%20Africa
/1/South%20Africa.pdf> 
 
INDC of United States (2015). The Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of United 
States. 13.2. 2016. 
<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20State
s%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%
20Information.pdf> 
 
IPCC (2014). Climate Change: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Summary for 
Policymakers. 32pp. 
 
Kaivo-Oja, J. (2014). Kiina vahvistaa rooliaan globaalissa ilmastomuutospolitiikassa. FICCA-
tutkimusohjelma, Suomen Akatemian tiedotteet. 4.12.2014 
<http://www.aka.fi/fi/A/Suomen-Akatemia/Mediapalvelut/Tiedotteet1/Kiina-vahvistaa-
rooliaan-globaalissa-ilmastomuutospolitiikassa-/>  
 
Kemp, L. (2016). US-Proofing the Paris Climate Agreement. Climate Policy, 1-16. 
 
Kopra, S. (2013). Kiina –Vastuullinen kehitysmaa? Kiinan ilmastodiskurssit ja globaali vastuu. 
Alue ja Ympäristö Helsinki. Alue- ja Ympäristötutkimuksen Seura ry 42: 2, 64–73. 
 
Kyoto Protocol (1998). Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. Text of Kyoto Protocol in English, United Nations. 5.5.2016 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf> 
 
Litfin, K. (2008). Planetary Politics. In Agnew, J., Mitchell, K. & G. Toal (ed.): A Companion 
to Political Geography, 470-482. Blackwell Companions to Geography. Blackwell 
Publishing, Oxford. 
 
Luostarinen, H. & E. Väliverronen (2007). Tekstinsyöjtä: Yhteiskuntatieteelliseen 
kirjallisuuden lukutaidosta. 239pp. Vastapaino, Tampere.  
 
  99 
Marklund, C. (2015). The Return of Geopolitics in the Era of Soft Power: Rereading Rudolf 
Kjellén on Geopolitical Imaginary and Competitive Identity. Geopolitics 20: 2, 248-
266.  
 
Moisio, S. (2015). Geopolitics/Critical Geopolitics. In Agnew, J., Mamdouh, V., Secor, A. & J. 
Sharp (ed.): Companion to Political Geography, 220-234. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford.  
 
Müller, M. (2008). Reconsidering the Concept of Discourse for the Field of Critical 
Geopolitics: Towards Discourse as Language and Practice. Political Geography 27, 
322-338.  
 
Müller, M. (2010). Doing Discourse Analysis in Critical Geopolitics. Les théories de la 
Géopolitique 12:3. 
 
Napoli, C. (2012). Understanding Kyotos Failure. SAIS Review 32: 2, 183-196. 
 
National Climate Change Programme (2007). Prepared under the Auspices of National 
Development and Reform Commission, People’s Republic of China. English 
Translation. 10.4.2016. 
<http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/200706/P020070604561191006823.pdf> 
 
Nayef, R. F. (2009). Neo-statecraft and Meta-geopolitics: Reconciliation of Power, Interests 
and Justice in the 21st Century. 361pp. LIT Verlag, Münster.  
 
Newman, D. (1998). The Geopolitical Imagination. Jerusalem Post, 10pp.  
 
Newman, D. (2000). Citizenship, Identity and Location: The Changing Discourse of Israeli 
Geopolitics. In Dodds, K. & D. Atkinson (ed.): Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of 
Geopolitical Thought, 302-331. Routledge, London. 
 
Nye, J. (2008a). Soft Power. Leadership Excellence 25: 4, 10pp.  
 
Nye, J. (2008b). Smart Power. Great Leaders Know when Hard Power Is Not Enough. Harvard 
Business Review 86: 11, 55pp. 
 
Nye, J. (2013). Hard, Soft and Smart Power. In Cooper, A., Heine, J. & R. Thakur (ed.): The 
Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, 1-20. Oxford Handbooks Online.  
 
Odgaard, O. & J. Delman (2014). China’s Energy Security and its Challenges towards 2035. 
Energy Policy 71, 107-117. 
 
Paris Agreement (2015). The English Text of the Paris Agreement, United Nations Framework 
on Climate Change. 22.6.2016 
  100 
<http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_
agreement.pdf> 
 
Power, M. (2003). Rethinking Development Geographies. 273pp. Routledge, London.  
 
Roberts, D. (2016). A global roadmap for climate change action: From COP17 in Durban to 
COP21 in Paris. South African Journal of Science 112: 5, 9. 
 
Rogelj, J., Schaeffer, M., Friedlingsteing, P., Gillet, N., Van Vuuren, D., Riahi, K., Allen, M. & 
R. Knutti (2016). Differences between carbon budget estimates unravelled. Nature 
Climate Change 6: 3, 245-252. 
 
Sidaway, J. (2011). Geographies of Development: New Maps, New Visions? Professional 
Geographer 64: 1, 49-62.  
 
Syri, S., Vihma, A., Airaksinen, M., Hast A., Järvelä, M., Ollikainen, M., Savolainen, I., 
Seppälä, J. & S. Soimakallio (2013). Suomen Ilmastopaneeli: Kansainvälisen ja EU:n 
ilmastopolitiikan ajankohtaisia teemoja. Suomen Ilmastopaneeli, Raportti 6. 18.6.2016. 
<http://www.ilmastopaneeli.fi/uploads/selvitykset_lausunnot/ilmastopaneelin_raportti6.
pdf> 
 
Schwerhoff, G. (2016). The Economics of Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation. Climate 
Policy 16: 2, 196-214.  
 
The Group of 77 (2016). General Information, The Group of 77 at the United Nations. 
18.6.2016 <http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html> 
 
Tuathail, Ó. & J. Agnew (1992). Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning 
in American Foreign Policy. Political Geography Quarterly 11: 2,190-204. 
 
Tuathail, Ó. & S. Dalby (1994). Critical Geopolitics: Unfolding Spaces for Thought in 
Geography and Global Polities. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 12: 5, 
513-514.  
 
Tuathail, Ó. (1998a). Thinking Critically about Geopolitics: Introduction. In Tuathail, Ó. 
Dalby, S. & P. Paul (ed.): The Geopolitics Reader, 1-12.  Routledge, London. 
 
Tuathail, Ó. (1998b). New World Order Geopolitics: Introduction. In Tuathail, Ó., Dalby, S. & 
P. Paul (ed.). The Geopolitics Reader, 103-113.  Routledge, London. 
 
UNFCCC INDC Submission Portal (2016). INDC submissions of Parties, United Nations. 
16.4.2016 
<http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx> 
 
  101 
UNFCCC (2016). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations. 
10.10.2016 <http://unfccc.int/2860.php> 
 
Varrall, M. (2013). Chinese Views on China's Role in International Development Assistance", 
Pacific Affairs, 86: 2, 233-255. 
 
Vihma, A. (2015). Paris Stress Test: Can the UN Climate Talks Deliver? FIIA Briefing Paper 
184. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 20.8.2016 
<http://www.fiia.fi/fi/publication/538/paris_stress_test/> 
 
Vihma, A., Mulugetta, Y. & S. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen (2011). Negotiating Solidarity? The G77 
through the Prism of Climate Change Negotiations. Global Change, Peace & Security 
23: 3, 315-334. 
 
Virtanen, A. & L. Rohweder (ed.) (2011). Ilmastonmuutos käytännössä. Hillinnän ja 
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